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sustainable debt path, a decline in interest rates paid on public
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Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel develop and  The oil shock is shown to reduce growth,
apply a macroeconomic general equilibrium  increase inflation, depreciate the real exchange
model for Zimbabwe.  The rnodel integrates a  rate, and reduce private investment in Zimba-
behavioral estimated model structure, taken from  bwe, a country heavily dependent on imported
a companion paper, with the relevant budget  oil.
constraints for a six-sector disaggregation into a
comprehensive framework.  Fiscal adjustment is a major challenge for
stabilization and growth faced by Zimbabwe's
Starting with 1988 as a base year, they  policymakers today.  The paper's simulations
present simulations for a base scenario covering  show that deep fiscal reforn  will significantly
the period 1988-95. From the different macro-  help Zimbabwe achieve a sustainable debt path,
economic issues and reform requirements  a decline in interest rates paid on public debt,
identified in the companion paper as relevant for  and a recovery of private consumption and
Ziimbabwe  today, they select two for performing  investment.
alternative scenario simulations here: a continua-
tion of the current oil shock and strong fiscal  (See companion paper, "Macroeconomic
stabilization.  Structure and Policy in Zimbabwe:  Analysis and
Empirical Model, 1965-88," WPS 771.)
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This  paper  develops  and  uses  a  macroeconomic  general  equilibrium  model  for
Zimbabwe. The  behavioral  model  structure  is  based  on  a  companion  piece  (Elbadawi
and Schmidt-Hebbel,  1991),  which lays out in detail the specification  and
estimation  results  for  goods  and  assets  markets. This  paper  adds  to the  latter
a detailed  stock-flow  consistent  budget  constraint  structure  for a 6-sector
disaggregation,  parameterized  for the  1988 base year.  It also discusses
alternative  closure  rules  and  general  equilibrium  properties  of the  model.
Our companion paper  identifies the main  issues and policy requirements
relevant for  Zimbabwe's current  macroeconomic situation and its future stability
and  growth prosricts.  This paper  selects two of these  issues to carry out
simulations which address them: the uncertainty associated to the current oil
shock and the need for fiscal adjustment.
Section  II  presents  the  complete  model  structure,  divided  by  budget
constraints an-i  related equations and the behavioral  structure for goods and
assets markets.  Section III discusses in detail alternative closure rules for
macroeconomic models  in general and presents the closure choices and general
equilibrium properties  of the Zimbabwe model.  Section IV discusses external
environment and policy assumptions for a base scenario which  combines a mild
transitory  oil shock and unchanged fiscal  policies and structural features of  the
Zimbabweaa economy.  The 1988-95  base scenario simulation results are presented
and  discussed  in  detail.  Section  V  presents  simulation  results  for two
alternative  scenarios.  The  first assumes  a worsening  external  environment
resulting  from a prolongation  and deepening  of the current oil price shock.
Simulation results for 1988-95 are also performed for  a  major fiscal adjustment,
carried throughout the 1991-95 period.  Section VI concludes.2.  A MACROECONOMIC  CENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM  (RMSM-XX)  MODEL  FOR ZIMBABWE
This section discusses in detail the model structure  of the Zimbabwe
RMSM-XX  macroeconomic  model.
The  specification  of any  macroeconomic  model  requires  to  make  decisions  in
three  areas:  sector  disaggregation,  marKet  disaggregation,  and behavioral  and
closure  rules. The  decisions  in  these  areas,  based  on the  economy's  structure,
the use of the model, and macroeconomic  theory.,  give rise to the three  main
building  blocks of a macroeconomic  model: sector  budget  constraints,  market
equilibrium conditions, and  behavioral equations/selection  of  endogenous
variables,  the  latter  determined  by the  closure  rule  decided  for  the  model. One
should  note that the  budget  constraints  and  market  equilibrium  conditions  are
independent  of the  chosen  closure  rule.  In particular,  the  market  equilibrium
conditions  are specified  independently  of having  instantaneous  market  clearing
achieved  by flexible  prices  or fix-price  equilibria  with quantity  adjustment.
The latter  choice  is reflected  by the  decision  in the  third  area:  closure  rule
(th selection  of endogenous/exogenous  variables)  and  behavioral  equations  (the
structure  of demands  and  supplies).
The  macroeconomic specification  chosen  for  Zimbabwe, reflected by
particular  decisions  in these  three  areas  which give  rise  to the  corresponding
building  blocks,  is  summarized  in  diagram  2.1. Six  agents  comprise  our  economy:
the  budgetary  (or  central)  government  (b),  the  other  public  sector  (o,  comprised
by public  enterprises  and local  government),  the  central  bank (cb,  the  Reserve
BalkJ  of  Zimbabwe),  the commercial  banking  sector  (bs,  the  consolidated  deposit
banks),  the  non-financial  private  sector  (p),  and the  external  sector (f,  the
rest of the  world).  This  disaggregation  is  consistent  with data  availability',
'  A data  base  for  the  other  public  sector,  collected  by  Walton  (1988),  used
by  Khadr  et al (1989),  and  extended  by Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990),  is  available. No
systematic  data  is  available  for  disaggregating  the  non-financial  private  sector
into  households  and firms.DIAGRAM  2.1
STRUCTURE  OF ZIMBABWE  RMSM-XX  MODEL
I.  AGENTS  OR SECTORS
Consolidated  Non-  I  1.  Budgetary  Government  Consolidated  Total
Financial  Public  Sector I  2.  Other  Public  Sector  (Fin.  and  Non-Fin.)
Monetary  3.  Central  Bank  Public  Sector
System  I  4.  Comm.  Banking  System  Consolidated  Total
5.  Non-Financial  Private  Private  Sector
6.  External  Sector
Budget  Constraints
II.  MARKETS
1.  Goods  Markets:  Domestic  Goods
Imported  Goods
2.  Assets  Markets:  Foreign  Assets  and  Liabilities
Domestic  Monetary  Assets  and  Liabilities
Domestic  Non-Monett&j  Assets  and  Liabilities
MARKET  EQUILIBRIUM  CONDITIONS
III.  BEHAVIORAL  RULES
1. Market  Clearing  in  Goods  and  Assets  Markets  at Endogenous  Goods
Prices  and  Assets  Returns
2.  Behavioral  Specification  of Goods  and  Assets
Demand  and  Supplies
3.  Alternative  Closure  Rules  for  External  Financing  and  Domestic
Financing  of Public  Sector
SELECTION  OF ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES
BEHAVIORAL  EQUATIONS
DEMANDS/SUPPLIESthe structure  of the Zimbabwean  economy 2,  and the relevant  questions  to be
addressed  by the  model. With  regard  to the  latter,  our  disaggregation  allows  to
address  directly  issues  of  monetary  and  domestic  debt  financing  of  public  sector
deficits,  by constructing  consolidated  total public sector  outstanding  debt
stocks.  These are obtained  by aggregating  the b, o and cb sectors  into the
consolidated  total  (financial  and  non-financi&l  public  sector  and  the  bs and  p
sectors  into  the  consolidated  total  (financial  and  non-financial)  private  sector.
On the-  other  side,  consolidation  of cb  and  bs into  the  monetary  system  allows  to
relate "ultimate"  monetary (base  money) and non-monetary  (total  consolidated
interest-bearing)  public  debt  holdings  to "intermediate"  financial  holdings  of
the  non-financial  private  sector  (MI  and  quasi-money).
Goods  markets  are  disaggregated  into  domestic  (or  national  or Zirrbabwean)
goods  and imported  goods. Domestic  goods  are  all  goods  produced  at home,  hence
GDP is equal to the supply  of domestic  goods.  Having  only one good on the
production  side,  it is not  necessary  to distinguish  between  domestic  final  and
intermediate  goods  supply,  although  the  production  of  the  domestic  good  requires
intermediate  imports. Demand  (for  consumption  and  investment,  by the  public  and
private  sectors)  falls  on domestic  and  national  goods. Demand  decisions  on the
composition  between dcmestic and  imported goods and  supply decisions on
intermediate  imports  determine  total  import  demand;  therefore  there  is no need
for specifying  independent  import  equations.  Finally,  a foreign  demand for
exports (which  are undistinguishable  from other  domestic  goods on the supply
side, reflecting  a large-country  assumption  for exports)  completes  the goods
market  structure.
Asset  markets  are disaggregated  into 10 foreign  assets  and liabilities,
4 monetary  assets (currency,  bank reserves,  MI and quasi-money)  and 12 non-
monetary  interest-bearing assets.  The  relatively  high  number  of
2  Zimbabwe  has a well-developed  commercial  banking sector  and a sizable
public enterprise  sector.  These features  justify  treating  the first sector
separately  from  the  central  bank (as  opposed  to  the  Zimbabwe  RMSM-X  model  which
aggregates  the  comme-cial  banking  sector  and  the  central  bank  into  one  monetary
sector)  and the second  sector  separate  from the non-financial  private  sector
(where  it  would stay implicitly  if  not treated  explicitly).-5-
monetary/financial  assets  is consistent  with the  intersectoral  capital  account
financing  flows  among  the  economy's  6  agents. The  economy's  aggregate  physical
capital  stock  is  the  only  physical  asset. No  labor  markets  are  considered  in  our
model.
With regard to behavioral  rules, the model assumes continuous  market
clearing  in the  main  goods  and  asset  ma;kets. Within-period  adjusting  domestic
goods  prices  (the  GDP  deflator)  clear  the  market  for  domestic  goods,  the  within-
period  adjusting  public  bond  interest  rate  clears  the  market  for  domestic  public
debt,  and  the  within-period  adjusting  interest  rate on quasi-money  (time  and
banking deposits) clears the market for quasi-money.  These three central,
pivotal  (relative)  prices  and  returns  act  as anchors  for  many other  prices  and
interest  rates. Domestic  prices  of  imported  goods  are  given  by  PPP  rules,  being
proportional  to the  exogenously  fixed  nominal  exchange  rate (which  acts  as the
nominal  price  anchor  or  numeraire),  international  prices,  and  tar-iff  rates. Some
prices  of domestic-good  aggregate  demand  components  are  determined  exogenously.
Most int  rest rates of domestic  interest-bearing  assets  are anchored  to the
above-mentioned  rates. Interest  rates  of foreign  assets  and  liabilities  are  set
exogenous  ly.
The  behavioral  specification  of  goods  and  assets  demands  and  goods  supply,
based fundamentally  on Elbadawi  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991),  reflects  standard
eclectic  specification  practices  combining  neoclassical  and  Keynesian  elements
under  backward-looking  expectations,  as discussed  in that  paper. Finally,  the
discussion  of alternative  closure  rules and the model's general  equilibrium
properties  is  postponed  until  section  3.
The six  sectors'  budget  constraints  and  related  equations  are introduced
in the next subsection,  followed  by the presentation  of market equilibrium
conditions  and  behavioral  equations  for  goods  and asset  markets.- 6  -
TABLE  2.1
VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS
Sector specific variables and intersectoral  flows are  represented  by the
following  subindices:
b  Budgetary  Government
o  Other  Public  Sector
cb  Central  Bank (Reserve  Bank  of Zimbabwe)
bs  Commercial  Banking  Sector  (Consolidated  Deposit  Banks)
p  Non-financial  Private  Sector
f  External  Sector
Intersectoral  flows  list  first  the  paying  sector  and  second  the  receiving  sector,
(for  instance,  Nbp denotes  net interest  payments  paid by b to p), unless  the
variable  identifies  one  of the two  sectors. For instance,  COGb  is the current
transfers  from  abroad;  i.e.  from  f to b.
Asset  or liability  stocks  are  distinguished  from  flows  by  adding  the  prefix  S  to
the  former. For  example,  SMI  is the  current-period  Ml stock,  while  MI denotes
the current-period  flow --  the  difference  between  SM1  and  SM1-,.
Liability  stocks  denote  first,  the sector  holding  the liability  and next the
issuer,  (for  instance,  SLpb  is the  stock  of loans  held  by the  private  sector  and
issued  bv  the  budgetary  government),  unless  the  stock  variable  identifies  either
the holder of issuer.  For example,  SNOLcb denotes the stock of net other
liabilities  held  by the  private  sector  and  issued  by the  central  bank.
Interest  rates  denote  the holder  and issuer  in the same  order followed  by the
liability  stocks  above.  For instance,  ipb is the interest  rate paid by the
budgetary  government  to the  private  sector; hence  Nbp - i'b * SLpb..l.
The prefix  R denotes  a revaluation  effect (capital  gains/losses  from nominal
exchange  rate  depreciation).
National-accounts  subindices  are  as follows:
c  consumption
i  fixed  investment
dom  domestic  (or  national)  good
imp  imported  goods
mint  intermediate  imports
exp  exports
The supra index *  denotes an external, foreign currency (USS) denominated
variable.
The following  list introduces  variable  definitions  in alphabetical  order.  In
general, lower-case  letters denote constant-price  variables and upper-case
letters  represent  current  price  variables.
B  consolidated  total  public  sector  debt  held by p
c  consumption
chst  change  in stocks
COG  current  transfers  from  abroad
DFI  direct  foreign  investment
dom  domestic  goods
DRS  depreciation  and  retained  surplus  of o
DY  current  disposable  income  of p
DYp  permanent  disposable  income  of p- 7 -
TABLE 2.1
(Cont.)
E  average-period  nominal  exchange  rate  (Z$/US$)
Ea  end-of-period  exchange  rate
EO  errors  and  omissions
exp  exports
FA  foreign  asssts
FL  foreign  liabilities
fi  fixed  investment
grp  growth  rate  of prices
H  monetary  base
imp  imported  goods
sh  share  variable
K  physical  capital  stock
KOG  capital  transfers  from  abroad
Knei  capital  flows  not elsewhere  included
L  loans
LS  short-term  loans  from  f to  p
mint  intermediate  imports
Ml  sum  of currency  and  demand  deposits
N  interest  payments
NFA  interest  payments  on FA
NFL  interest  payments  on FL
NIMF  interest  payments  on IMF
Nknei  interest  payments  on Knei
NNIOL  interest  payments  on NOL
NOL  Net  other  liabilities  held  by p
NS  interest  payments  on LS
OthR  Other  revenue  of b from  p
P  GDP deflator;  domestic  price  index
QM  quaSi-money
Res  reserves  of  bs at cb
Resid  net current-account  surplus  of financial  institutions
PR  profit  remittances
pro  private  sector  profits
S  saving
PH  t-expected  private  fixed  investment  inflation  in t+l
SuA  subsidies  to p
pg  productivity  gains
T  current  transfers  to p (with  subindices)
T  time  counter
ta  ad valorem  tariff  rate
Td  direct  taxes
Ti  indirect  taxes
WI  wage index
y  GDP
Yf  factor  income
yp  potential  output-8-
2.1  Budget  Constraints
The within-period  (or flow)  budget  c  nstrain.s  for the six sectors  are
introduced  next, following  closely the structure  of equations  of the RMSM-X
models  (see  in  particular  Ventura  (1990)  and  Khadr  et al. (1990)  for  Zimbabwe).
Each sector's budget constraint is split into two equations: one for the
difference  between  current-account  sources  and  uses  of  funds  (equal  to  above-the-
line  saving)  and  the  second  for  the  difference  between  capital-account  use&  and
sources  of funds (equal  to below-the-line  saving). All  variables,  defined  in
table  2.1,  are  measured  in  current-price,  local  currency  units,  unless  otherwise
specified.  The  following equations (A1.1) - (Al.12) co;ustitute  the set of 12
budget constraints.
Bu&getary Government:
(A11.1)  Yfb  + Td  + Ti  +  Residb  + Ot2R  +  CoGb  +  Nob  -Pcb
- Cb  - SUbb  - T  - Tbp  Nb  Nbbs  - Nbp  Nbf  =  Sb
(A1.2)  Pib  fib + Lb.  - KOGb  - LCbb  - LbBb  - Lpb  Lfb =Sb
Other Public Sector:
(A1.  3)  DRS  +  Tbo  + COGo  -PoCc,  - SUb 0 - Top  -Nb  -NCb
- Nb.  - Np  -No*  So
(A1.  4)  Pi,  fio  - KOGo  -L  - Lbso  Lpo  Lfo  o
Central Bank:
(A1.  5)  Nbcb  + NOcb  + Nbscb  + Npcb  + NFAcb  -NRES  - NNOLCb
-NFLcb  - NIMF-  ResidCb  =  scb(Al.6)  La,b  + Lebo  + Lcbbs  + Lcbp  + FACb + RFACb  ReS
- Cu  - NOLCb  - FLcb  - RFLCb  - IMF  - RIMF  =  SCb
Commercia,  Banks:
(Al.7)  Nbbs  +  Nobs  +  NRes  +  Npbs  +  NFAbs  -NbBcb  NQ
- NNob,:,  - NFLbS  - ResidbS=  Sba
(A1.8)  Lbsb  +  Lbso  +  Res  +  LbSp  +  FAb5  + RFAbS  Lcbbs
- (Mi-CU)  - QM  - NOLbS  - FLbS  -RFLbs  =  Sb5
Private  Sector:
(Al.9)  Yfp  +  Tbp  +  Top  +  Tfp  +  Residb,  +  COGp  +  Nbp  +  Nop
NOLb  +N  + N  LbS  - Pcp  C, - Td-  OthR  - PR
- Npcb  - -Lpb,  - Npf  - NSpf  - Nknei  =Sp
(Al.10)  Pip fi  p  +  Pchsc  chst  + Lpb  +  Lpo  + NOLCb  + MI  +  QM  + NOLbs
- KOGp  - DFI  - Lcbp  - Lbsp  - Lfp  - LSfp  fCnei  P
External  Sector:
(Al.11)  P,,p  imp  - Pxp  exp  - COGb  - COG,  - COGp  - Tf  +  PR
+  Nb!  +  Nof  +  NFL,b  + NIMF  +  NFLbs  +  N,f +  NSpf
+  Nknei  - NFACb  - NFAbS  =  Sf- 10  -
(A1.  12)  KOGb  + KOGo  + KOGp  + DFI  + Lfb  +  Lfo  +  FLcb  + RFLCb
+  IMF  + RIMF  + FLbs  +  RFLbS  + Lfp  LS  +  Knel
+  EO  - FA,b  - RFAb  - FAbs  - RFAb,  =  Sf
As an implication  of Walras' law, one equation  of the complete  set of
equations  comprised  by the budget  constraints  introduced  here and the  market
equilibrium  conditions  introduced  below,  is redundant. For  our  model  we choose
this  to be  the external  sector budget  constraint  (the balance  of  payments
equation).  Hence its two components, equations (AI.11) and (A1.12), are listed
above for accounting completeness, not for determining any endogenous variable
in the Zimbabwe RMSM-XX mode:.
Assumptions on the monetary system
While  government  accounts  are generally  defined on  a  cash  basis,  the
exteinal, national and monetary acc=nunts  are typically on an accruals basis. 3
This paper  does  not attempt  to solve  this inconsistency,  implying  that  the
residual sector in constructing the data base (the private sector) implicitly
reflects  discrepancies  between  accrual  and  cash  flows  from  other  sectors.
However, one particular source of differences between accrual and cash flows is
addressed by  our  framework:  capital  gains and  losses due  to exchange  rate
variations.  With  regard  to  this  particular  accruals  source,  the  budget
constraints of the central bank and the commercial banking sector are defined on
accruals basis, while the four non-bank sectors' budget constraints are defined
on cash basis.  The  reason for this  is that the  source of  information for
deriving the capital account flows for the former two sectors is the balance
sheets of these sectors.  To insure  consistency between these two accruals-basis
budget  constraints  and  the cash-basis  budget constraints  of  the  other  four
sectors,  the changes  in the domestic-currency values  of  foreign assets  and
3  See Host-Madsen  (1979) for a more detailed discussion.- 11  -
liabilities  held  by  cb  and  bs are  decomposed  into  the  foreign-currency  (or  cash)
asset  accumulation  and the  capital  gain (or  loss)  due  to a depreciation  of the
nominal  exchange  rate.'
Another  feature  of the  two  monetary-system  sectors,  shared  with the  RMSM-X
models,  is the  assumption  that  saving  is zero  in each of them.  The  difference
between  gross  interest  receipts  and  payments  is assumed  to  be fully  paid  by cb
to the budgetary  government  (ResidCb)  and by be to the non-financial  private
sector  (Residbd).  The zero-saving  assumption  is simply:
(A2 1)  Scb  =  0
(A2.  2)  Sbs  =
Interest  Payments
Domestic-currency  interest  payments  from  sector  j  to  sector  k  on  liability
SL issued  by j  and  held by k are  defined  as:
(A3.*)  NJk  =  ikJSLkj,  -1
In the case of interest  payments  on foreign  assets  or liabilities  (i.e.
when either  j or k are substituted  by f), the domestic-currency  value of the
outstanding  foreign-currency  liability  is  valued  at  the  preceding  end-of-period
nominal  exchange  rate:
SLk,  -1  =  E ISL;j, 
4  The  changes  in outstanding  asset  and  liability  holdings  of the  cb and  bs
sectors  include  accrued  non-realized  capital  gains  and  losses  due  to  changes  in
asset prices.  In order to obtain consistency  between these two sectors'
accruals-basis  budget constraints  and the other sectors'  cash-basis  budget
constraints,  we have  to  deal  explicitly  with  one  source  of  capital  gains/losses:
the  gains (losses)  on foreign-asset  (liability)  holdings  due to a depreciation
of the  nominal  exchange  rate.  Hence  the  tota  hange  in the  domestic-currency
value  of a foreign  asset  or liability  stock,  as  reflected  by the  accruals-basis
capital  accounts  in  equations  (AI.6)  and  (AI.8),  is  decomposed  into  its  foreign-
currency  cash  change  (for  instance,  FA,b in  equation  A1.6),  and  the  capital  gain
due to an increase  in the  nominal  exchange  rate (RFAC  in  Al.6).  Finally  note
that  this  procedure  is  consistent  with the  treatment  ot  the  relation  between  all
foreign  asset and liability  stocks  and flows in section  2.2 below,  based on
considering  depreciation-induced  capital  gains  and losses.- 12 -
Appendix  1  presents  all  equations  for interest  payments.
A Flow of Funds  Matrix  for  Zimbabwe,  1988
Using  the  most  recently  available  data  on  budgetary  and  other  public  sector
current  and capital  accounts,  balance  of payments  flows,  foreign  debt stocks,
monetary  system  assets  and  liability  stocks,  and  national  accounts  flows,  the  six
sectors'  budget  constraints  were  parameterized  for  1988. A detailed  discussion
of (i)  the  available  data  sources,  (ii)  the  criteria  for  selecting  certain  data
sources  over  alternatives,  and (iii)  the  data transformations,  is presented  in
Appendix  2.
Combining  the  budget  constraints  with  the  current-price  income-expenditure
equation  of  the  national  accounts  (equation  B6.1  below),  the  flow-of-funds  matrix
for the 1988  base year is presented  in table  2.2.  Following  standard  RMSM-X
presentations,
5 the table displays the budget constraints  divided into the
current  and capital  accounts,  each  of them  by sources  of funds (rows)  and  uses
of funds  (columns).
2.2  Market  Eauilibrium  Conditions  and  Behavioral  Structure
Assets  and goods  markets  equilibrium  conditions  and  behavioral  structure
follow closely the  specification  and estimation results presented in our
companion  paper. Therefore  the  discussion  here  will be sparse,  with exception
of  the  treatment  of  financial  asset  accumulation  equations,  which  are  introduced
only  in this  paper,  and  modifications  on some  of the  estimated  equations  of our
companion  paper.
Asset  Markets  Equilibrium  Conditions
The  model  notation does  not  distinguish explicitly between asset
(liability)  stock supplies  and demands.  The model distinguishes  between 26
monetary  and financial  assets  and  one  physical  asset  (physical  capital).
'  See for instance  Khadr  et al. (1989)  and  Ventura  (1990).- 13  -
TABLE 2.2
SECTOR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND INCOME/EXPENDITURE EQUATION BY
CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS:  ZIMBABWE. 1988.
CURRENT  Budgetary  Other Public  Central  Banking  Private  External  National  Total ACCOUNT  Gov't  Scctor  Bank  Sv*tem  Sector  Sector  Accoune  Sourcea
Budgetary  Nob  120.3  Resideb  59.4  Td  1.795.9  COGb  0  Yfb  0  3,908.9 Government  Ti  974.8
______________  ______________  ~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~-Subb  0
Other Public  tbo  469.S  CO0o  0  DRS  .23.1  446.7 Sc  tor_  __
Central  Nbcb  39.5  Nocb  23.6  Nbscb  -4.5  Npeb  0  NFAcb  18.4  77.0 Bank  I
Banking  Nbbe  50.0  Nobe  84.8  NRes  0  Npbp  200.3  N?Abe  1.7  336.8 Svstes  . _
Private  Tbp  470.9  Top  0  NNOLcb  -4.9  NQ6  133.7  Tip  9  0  Yfp  9,690.3  10,897.0 Sector  Nbp  365.6  Nop  32.5  NNOLBS  36.4  COp  0
External  Nbf  192 .3  Nof  40.8  NFLcb  4.3  NFLbs  7.1  Npf  37.1  -Exp  -3,325.6  -5.6 Sector  NIX.F  18.1  Nspf  44.2  lIp  2.,31.5
PR  33.  6
_NKnel  0  1
National  Cb  2  449.8  Co  0  Scb  0  Sbe  0  Cp  5,500.5  Sf  -45.7  10,247.9 Accounts  Sb  -128.9  So  144.7  1  1  1  Sp  2,327.5  _
Total  3.909.0  446.7  76.9  336.8  10,897.6  -16.6  10,247.  9 Use 
I
CAPITAL  Budgetary  Other  Public  Central  Banking  Private  External  National  Total ACCOUNT  Gov't  Sector  Bank  System  Sector  Sector  Accountx  Sources
Budgetary  Lcbb  -32.1  Lbeb  184.2  Lpb  393.0  LOGb  106.7  Sb  .128.9  662.1 Government  Lib  139.2  _____________
Othor Public  Lbo  158.1  Lcbo  -31.0  Lbeo  62.1  Lpo  112.4  LOGo  0  So  144.7  446.3 Sector  Lie  0  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Central  Bank  Res  73.  9  NOLcb  -113.3  Fleb  -14.6  Scb  0  -52.  3
Cu  114.0  R?FLcb  9.2
ItM  153.4
_____________  ~~~~~  ~~~~~  ~  ~~  ~~RIM?  31.9  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Banking  Lcbbe  -49.0  Qht  240.2  FLbs  2.0  Sbe  0  773- System  Ki  378.1  RYLbe  17.3
NOLbe  184.8
Private  Lcbp  0  Lbop  327.8  DOFp  0  Sp  2,327.5  2.542.5 Sector  DFI  7.4
Lfp  .485.5
LS  ip  75.8
Kr.  eL  0
_  ~~~~~~~~~EO  2 99  P
External  FAcb  -16.4  FAbs  3.8  Sf  -45.7  25.5 Sector  RFAcb  76.2  RfAbe  7.6
National  lb  504.0  lo  446.3  Ip  962.0  2,297.6
Accounts  I__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Chstk  385.3  _  _  _  _  _  _
Total  6f2.1  446.3  -52.3  773.4  2,542.5  25.5  2,297.6
U se  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  __  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _- 14 -
Interest  rates  of a few central  monetary  and financial  assets  clear the
respective  markets  during  the relevant  period.  Most other interest  rates  of
domestic  interest-bearing  assets  are fixed  to these  pivotal  rates.  Interest
rates  on foreign  assets  and  liabilities  are  determined  exogenously.  All assets
are  assumed  to be held  voluntarily  at current  interest  rates.
The  asset  market  equilibrium  conditions  are  reflected  by  the  corresponding
asset accumulation  equations, relating asset stocks and flows, which are
introduced  next.
Finarcial/Monetary  Assets  Accumulation  Equations
End-of-period  domestic-currency  financial  or  monetary  assets  (liabilities)
increase  over time  by the  simple  accumulation  equation:
(BI.*)  SLkj  =  Lkj  + SLkj,  l
The  change  in  the  domestic-currency  value  of  a  foreign-currency  denominated
asset  (or  liability)  involves  foreign-currency  accumulation  and  capital  gains  (or
losses)  components. The capital  gains  or losses  are  caused  by changes  in the
nominal  exchange  rate. One  capital  gain  or loss  stems  from  the  different  timing
of foreign  currency  accumulation  in the  budget  constraints  (valued  at average-
period  exchange  rates)  as  compared  to  the  balance  sheets  (valued  at  end-of-period
exchange  rates). The second  is due  to the  better-known  annual  (between  end  of
periods)  nominal  exchange  rate depreciation,  which causes  a gain (loss)  on a
foreign  asset (liability)  in  proportion  to the  rate  of devaluation.
Hence  end-of-period  domestic-currency values  of  foreign-currency
denominated  assets  (or  liabilities)  increase  over time  as follows:
(B1.**)  SLkj  =  E  (SL,j  - SLk,  )  + RLkY + SLkl  -
where the first term on the left-hand  side reflects  the foreign-currency  (or
cash)  asset  accumulation  expressed  in  domestic  currency  units  and  the  second  term
is  the  capital  gain (or  loss)  due  to  exchange  rate  devaluations.  The  latter  is- 15  -
the sum of a timing  capital  gain (or  loss) stemming  from the above-mentioned
difference  between  end-of-period  and  period-average  exchange  rates  affecting  the
foreign-currency  asset  flow  and  the  devaluation  capital  gain (or  loss)  stemming
from  the  end-of-period  exchange  rate  devaluation  affecting  the  initial  foreign-
currency  asset  stock:
(B1.***)  RI4,  E(SL,  _ SL;,.  1)  tE  +  (E!1  SL,  )  [ES'-E'
Note  that  only  the  first  right-hand  term  of  equation  (4.**),  the  cash-base
change,  is  reflected by budget  equations  (A1.1)  - (A1.12),  while  end-of  period
domestic-currency  valued foreign-currency  holdings  SLkj  on the left-hand  side
enter  balance  sheets.
Appendix  1  presents  the  26 asset  accumulation  equations.
Physical  Asset  Accumulation  Eguation
Physical  capital  grows  with net total  domestic  fixed-capital  investment,
which is equal  to gross  fixed  investment  (fi) less  capital  depreciation  at an
annual  rate  of 4.5%:
(B2.1)  K  =  (1-0.045)K-1 + fi
Asset  Markets  Behavioral  Structure
The  nominal  interest  rates  on  consolidated  public  sector  domestic  debt  and
on  quasi-money  are  determined  by the  following  portfolio  equilibrium  equations:
(B3A.)  S)  =  aO +  al  ^B +  a 2 log  (y)
SB
(B3.2)  log(-)  =  bo  + b1 ioN  +  b2 log(y)
SQM
The  values  of  the  coefficients  of  these  and  subsequent  behavioral  equations
are listed  in table  2.3,  which  is based  on the simulation  results  of our
companion  paper.  Most  other  domestic  interest  rates  are  anchored  to  these  two
rates  by  a  set  of  equations  introduced  in  Appendix  1.- 16 -
Goods  Market  Equilibrium  Condition
The goods market equilibrium  condition  is given by the constant-price
income-expenditure  equation  which  relates  output  to aggregate  demand:
(B4.1)  y  cp  +  Cb  +  fiP  +  fib  + fio  + chst  + exp  - imp
Due  to  the  fact  that  ours  is  a  one-good  model  on  the  supply  side  and  a  two-
goods  model  on  the  demand  side,  (B5.1)  can  be  explicitly  re-written  as  the  market
equilibrium  condition  for  domestic  goods:
(B4.1')  y  =  dom,p  + impcp  + domcb  +  impcb  +  dom1,  + impip
domib  +  imp!b  + dom 1o  + imp10 +  chst  + exp
- [imp,  + impCb  implb  +  implb  + imp, 0 +  mint]
where each aggregate demand component is decomposed  into its domestic and
imported  parts.
Assuming continuous  market clearing, equation (B4.1') is an implicit
equation  for the  GDP deflator. This national  goods  price relevant  for supply
decisions  is related  to the aggregate  demand  deflators  by equations  (B6.1)  -
(B6.19)  introduced  below.
Goods  Market  Behavioral  Structure
Potential  Output  and  Output  SuRplv
Potential  output  is  -elated  to lagged  end-of-period  physical  capital  by a
constant  and  a variable  reflecting  capital  productivity  gains:
(B5.1)  yp  =  (0.5241 +  pg)  K-1
Output  supply  (relative  to  potential  output)  depends  on the  productivity-
adjusted  real  product  wage  and  the  real  price  of intermediate  imports  (values  of
coefficients  of behavioral  equations  are  listed  in table  2.3):- 17  -
(BS.2)  log(.Z)  =  co  +  cl  Plog(  p
yp  ~~~WI  exp  (O.OO8T71
+  C2 (1-P)log(  P
Pmint
Finally,  producers'  demand  for  intermediate  imports  (relative  to  potential
output) is determined  by output (relative  to potential  output) and relative
prices:
(BS.3)  ypint  =  do  + d1 ( . )  + d  ( WI  exp(O  .0  T)  )  +  d  Pi
yp  4p  p  3  p
Private  ConsumRtion
Private  consumption  in  equation  (B5.4)  combines  Keynesian,  permanent-income
and  Ricardian-cum-direct-crowding-out  determinants.  Expected  permanent  public
saving  (for  the  latter  hypothesis)  is assumed  to  be formed  according  to  current
public  saving  levels  (the  sum  of current  b and o saving). Private  disposable
income  is derived  from the  private  sector  current  account (equation  A1.9),  as
reflected  by equation  (B7.3). Finally,  permanent  private  disposable  income  is
a fixed  share  of potential  output,  as reflected  by equation  (B5.5).
(B5.4)  P  c  eo + el  DY  + e2  DY
(B5.5)  DYPp  DYp py88  ) p  y
The  composition  of  aggregate  private  consumption  is  determined  by  relative
prices  of importea  and domestic  consumption  components,  as reflected  for the
domestic  to aggregate  consumption  ratio  by the following  equation.  Domestic
private  consumption  is obtained  residually  in  equation  (B5.7).
(B5.6)  =  fo  + fi  p
CP  PDowp
(B5.7)  impp  =cp  - domcp- 18 -
TABLE  2.3
VALUES  FOR  COEFFICIENTS  OF BEHAVIORAL  EQUATIONS
This  table  lists  the  values  of  behavioral  equation  coefficients  introduced
in the text.  Most of these coefficients  are taken directly  from the best
estimation  results  presented  in  our  companion  paper. However,  some  coefficients
are altered to ensure, first, that historical 1988 base year values were
preserved, and  second, that the  projection results reflected reasonable
magnitudes.
1.  Monetary  Base/Domestic  Public  Debt  Portfolio  Equation
Intorcs  t  Add
ao  -13.903  +  1.584
+  (-3.034 - (-12.138)*(0.1330)  (a,  correction}
+  (1.286 - (0.000)*Log(4557)  (a 2 correction}
a,  -12.138
a2 0.000
2.  Ml/QM  Portfolio  Equation
Intercapt  Add  tS  Trend
bo  -2.796  +  (-0.027)  +  (-0.464)
b,  -4.453
bz  0.342
3.  Output  Supply  Equation
Intorc  +t  Add
CO  -0.104  +  0.007
C,*fl  0.692  *  0.924
-l*(1-0)  0.692  *  0.076
4. Demand  for  Intermediate  Imports  Equation
Inte  ty  +  (_O  Add
do0  0.12  +  (-0.027)




5. Private  Consumption  Equation
Interco  t  Add
eo  0.605  + (-0.042)
e,  0.116
e 2 0.673
6. Domestic  Private  Consumption  Equation
Interco  t  Add
fo  0.848  + (-0.003)
f,  0.052- 19  -
TABLE  2.3
(Cont.)
7. Total  Fixed  Private  Investment  Equation
Snteryy  Add
go  -0.  5 + 0.001






8. Domestic  Fixed  Private  Investment  Equation
Intercept  Add
ho  0.331  +  (-0.106)
hi  0.118
9. Export  Demand  Equation
Intercept  Add




Intercept  Original  regression coefficient.
Add  1988  regression  residual.
Correction  Factors added to constant terms to compensate for changes in
estimated  regression  coefficients  introduced  in  the  simulation
model.
In all nine equations  the  Add term  was  included  to calibrate  the 1988
projected  values of the behavioral  equations  to actual 1988 base-year
values.  In equations  1, 2, and 7 coefficients  were altered  from dhe
values  estimated  in  the  companion  paper. Thus  a corresponding  Correction
term  was added  to  each  to  maintain  the  1988  projection  value  equal  to  the
historical  values.- 20 -
Private  Fixed Investment
Private fixed investment  in equation (B5.8)  combines neoclassical  and
liquidity-constraint  determinants:  the  real  user  cost  of  capital  (split  into  the
investment-based  real  interest  rate  and  the  relative  price  of  investment  goods),
the  average  product  of  capital  (o.  proxy  for  the  marginal  product),  firm  profits,
and  monetary  base. Expected  investment  goods  inflation  in  the  real  interest  rate
is assumed to follow regressive  expectations  in equation (B5.9): expected
inflation  for the next period is inversely  related  to the  difference  between
current-period  producer  price  inflation  and capital  goods  price  inflation.
(B5.  8)  i  =  go  +  g1 [iL  +  0.045--i  .+] +  92  (  p- )  +
y  *  p
4.g 3 (.LY )  +  g4 ( Pm)  + g5 SH)
1(1~~~~~~~~~-
(B5.9)  ip, +1  I.  5 ( PP1)  0 . 5 (.Pp  PPiP1)
'-1  pip,-I
The composition  of aggregate  private  fixed investment  is  determined  by
relative  prices  of  imported and domestic fixed investment components,  as
reflected  for  the  domestic  to  aggregate  fixed  investment  ratio  in  the  following
equation. Domestic  private  fixed  investment  is  obtained  residually  in equation
(B5.11).
(B5.10)  =ho  + h,  PiP
ff.l  PD.Ifp
(B5.11)  impfip  =  fip  - domfip
Exaorts
The  foreign  demand  for  Zimbabwe  exports  depends  on  the  lagged  export  price
relative  to  international  prices  of  possible  substitutes,  and  foreign  income  as- 21  -
captured  by OECD  GDP:'
(B5.12)  exp  =  jo +  jl (p,  )  +  j2  (ZY.)
Y  PAI  Y
Public  Sector  Behavior
The following  equationc  define  public  sector  aggregate  demand  components
as fixed  sharee  of real  GDP:
(B5.13)  domCb  shdocb  y
(B5.14)  domib  Shdomib  Y
(B5.15)  impib  S-himpib  Y
(B5.  16)  dom1o  - ShdomO  Y
(B5.  17)  imp1o  =shiwpo  Y
Further  adding-up  equations  for  constant-price  demands  are  in  Appendix  1.
Goods  Prices
In addition  to the national  goods  market equilibrium  condition,  which
determines  the  GDP  deflator,  price  equations  for  all  aggregate  demand  components
have  to be introduced.
The  current-price  income-expenditure  equation  will  be  used  to  determine  the
deflator  for the  change  in  stocks:
'The low magnitude of the price coefficient  (-0.06),  implying  a price
elasticity  of  the  foreign  demand  for  Zimbabwean  exports  of  0.20,  should  be taken
with  care. It  does  not  seem  to moe  consistent  with  price  taking  (instead  of  price
setting)  by Zimbabwean  exporters.- 22  -
(B6.  1)  Pchat=  [(  Y-  PC  p  - PCb  cb  - Pip  fip
sib  fib  Pio  fio  - Pew  exp
+ P...  imp] /chst
A set of law-of-one-price  equations  for domestic  prices  of exports  and
iaports,  exogenous  projection  rules for domestic  goods prices and adding-up
restrictions  for  aggregate  deflators  are introduced  in Appendix  1.
Auxiliary  Linkages
Finally,  auxiliary  equations  which  link  asset  stocks  and income  flows  of
the budget constraints  with variables  of the market clearing  conditions  are
introduced  at the  end  of Appendix  1.- 23  -
3.  MODEL  CLOSURE  AND GENERAL  EQUJILIBRIUM
As mentioned  in the preceding  section,  the third  building  block of any
macroeconomic  model  requires  selecting  the  set  of  endogenous  variables,  that  is,
the  model's  closure. This section  discusses  the  closure  options  available  for
the  Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX  model  and  the  macroeconomic  general  equilibrium  properties
of the  model.
3.1  Closure  Options  and  Choices
Closure,  the selection  of endogenous  and exogenous  variables, is driven in
principle  by the structure  of the economy and the issues addressed  by the
macroeconomic  mcdel.  To  facilitate  discussion  of  closure options, let's
summarize  the  macroeconomic  model  of the  preceding  section  into four  building
blocks,  identifying  in  square  brackets  the  main  variables  which  can  be determined
endogenously  by each  block. The  four  blocks  are  the  budget  constraints  (BC),  the
current-price  income  expenditure  condition  (IE),  the  asset  markets  block (AM),
and the  goods  markots  block (GM):
1.  BC  [  Five  current  account  and five  capital  account  variables
2.  IE  L  Output  or I  aggregate  demand  component  or 1  price ]
3.  AM  t  AS(ik,...)  ]
4.  GM  [ y(pJ,...)  ,  ad, ,  adp(pj,-..)  ,  adf
We  will  discuss  closure  choices  for  blocks  2-4  immediately,  postponing  the
choice  of budget  constraint  closure  for  afterwards.
The assets-markets  block  determines  either  asset  stock  supplies  (AS)  or
interest  rates  (ik).  The goods  market  block'  determines  a certain  combination
of output (y),  goods prices (pj),  private  sector  aggregate  demand  components
'  A more  disaggregate  model  than  our 1-sector  disaggregation  of the  supply
would determine  as  many price/quantity  pairs  as sectors  are  considered.- 24 -
(ad.),  and  consolidated  public  sector  aggregate  demand  components  (ad.).
A first  decision  of closure  has  to be  made  on the  possible  endogeneity  of
public-sector  aggregate  demand  components  and public sector liabilities. A
positive  macro.conomic  closure  treats  these  public  sector  variables  as  exogenous,
and  solves  the  model  for  all  macroeconomic  variables,  such  as  output,  prices  and
interest  rates.  The normative  closure  inverts  the  model:  by fixing  exogenous
targets  for interest  rates,  prices  or output  levels,  it solves  the  model for
public  sector  liability  stocks  (and  flows)  and  public  sector  aggregate  demand
components  or revenue  items.
Table  3.1  gives  an example  of  positive  and  normative  closure  rules  in the
context  of  our  model. Under  the  positive  closure,  the  IE  equation  determines  one
private  sector  price  or aggregate  demand  component,  while under the  normative
closure  the adjusting  variable  is a public-sector  quantity,  price or revenue
item. The  asset  markets  block  determines  either  asset  returns  or  stock  supplies,
depending  on the closure.  Finally,  public aggregate  demand components  and
revenue  items  are exogenous  in the goods  markets  under the positive  closure,
implying  that output and the price level are determined endogenously.  A
normative  GM closure,  however,  involves  targeting  either inflation  or growth
exogenously, hence  solving for  one  particular public sector revenue or
expenditure  item.
The  Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX  model  applied  in  sections  4  and  5  below  is  based  only
on a positive closure,  combined with alternative  closures for the budget
constraints  as discussed  below,  in order  to avoid  a mushrooming  of simulation
alternatives  below. However,  the  model  could  be easily  inverted  for  a  normative
closure  along  the  choices  summarized  in table  3.1.- 25  -
TABLE 3.1
ALTERNATIVE  CLOSURE  RULES FOR
INCOME-EXPENDITURE  EQUATION  (IE).
ASSETS MARKETS BLOCKS  (AM) AND  GOODS  MARKETS  BLOCK (GM)
POSITIVE  CLOSURE  NORMATIVE  CLOSURE
Exogenous  Endogenous  Exogenous  Endogenous
Variables  Variables  Variables  Variables
IE  All  other  one  adp  or  All other  one ad,  or one  p,
one p.
AM  Stock  supplies  Interest  rates  Interest  rates  Stocks supplies
of public  of  public  sector
sector  liabs.  liabilities
GM  adg  adp  and  y  Other  ad.;  adp  and  one ad.;
and  p; other  y or p  p or y;
prices  other  prices
Notation:
y is  GDP. ad isl  aggregate  demand  component.  p is price  level,  and subindeces  p
and & denote  the  private  and  the  consolidated  public  sector.- 26 -
Under  the  positive  closure  the  deflator  for  the  change  in stocks  has  been
chosen  as  the  endogenous  variable  for  the  IE  equilibrium  condition,  as  reflected
by  equation  (B6.1)  above. 8 Asset  markets  determine  interest  rates  i.  and  it for
given  stock  supplies  (including  public  sector  liabilities)  in equations  (B3.1)
and  (B3.2). Finally,  the  goods  market  equilibrium  condition  (the  combination  of
equations  (B4.1)  and (B5.2))  determines  jointly  real  GDP  and its  deflator,  for
exogenously  given  public  sector  spending  and tax  levels.
Let us turn  now to the determination  of closure  for the 10 independent
budget constraint equations (Ai.1) - (A1.10).  We discuss separately current and
capital accounts.
For the  current-account or  above-the-line equations the  natural candidates
for endogenous variables are sector saving levels,  In fact we choose these for
the three non-financial sectors (Sb,  S.,  Sp).  However, central bank and banking
sector saving are restricted to zero by equations (A2.1) - (A2.2).  For the cb
current account we take ResidCb,  the central bank's gross margin transferred to
the budgetary government,  as the adjusting variable.  In the case of the bs
current account,  we made the analogous choice of having Residb.,  the gross  margin
transferred to the private sector, as the adjusting variable.
The closure options for the budget capital accounts involve decisions in
three dimensions: how binding the foreign resource constraint is, which sector
(private or public) bears external adjustment, and which is the source of the
domestic financing of the budget deficit (monetary or non-monetary financing).
Table 3.2 specifies eight alternative pairings of endogenous public and private
sector budget constraints based on combinations of the above mentioned  three
dimensions.  For instance,  given  that the foreign  resource  constraint  is not
eP  t  was chosen  as the adjusting  variable  in order  to avoid spill-over
effects  from  changing  relative  prices  into  private  sector  behavioral  equations,
other  than  the  immediate  effect  of the  change  of Ph.,  (or  any  other  variable)  on
a  private  or  public  sector  aggregate  demand  component  when the  foreign  resource
constraint is binding.- 27 -
binding,  if the  private  sector  bears  external  adjustment  and  domestic  financing
of the  CPSD,  and  if the  latter  is  money-financed,  then  net foreign  private  debt
and  domestic  monetary  base  issues  are  the  main  adjusting  variables  of  the  capital
accounts.  However, if a  foreign resource constraint emerges due  to  an
interruption  of  voluntary  foreign  lending  flows,  and  if  the  public  sector  bears
the foreign  adjustment  and in addition  shifts  to domestic  debt financing,  the
main adjusting  endogenous  variables  are  public  spending  (public  consumption  or
investment)  and  domestic  public  debt issues.
Table 3.3 identifies  the eight  sets  of 5 endogenous  variables  under the
above mentioned closure rules in the Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX  model.  To simplify
comparison,  we assume  that the  other  public  sector's  and the banking  sector's
capital accounts determine continuously  only  one variable  (LCbO  and  Lb,p,
respectively),  being  unaffected  by changes  in  closure  rules. The  central  bank's
adjusting  variables  are  currency  or  net  private  sector  loan  flows,  depending  on
the  domestic  CPSD  financing  assumption. One  point  illustrated  by this  table  is
that in  the absence  of a foreign  resource  constraint,  actual  domestic  spending
is equal  to its  notional  level  and foreign  lending  adjusts  to desired  domestic
spending  levels. In  terms  of  balance  of  payments  adjustment,  the  external  sector
current  account  drives  the  capital  account. A foreign  lending  squeeze  inverts
this  causality,  implying  that  (at  least)  one  domestic  aggregate  demand  component
--  and hence the external current account  --  adjusts passively to the capital
account  of  the  balance  of  payments.  For  the  foreign  saving  binding/public  sector
adjustment/domestic  financing  closure  in line  2.1,  the  main adjusting  variables
are  budgetary  consumption  or fixed  investment  (cb/fib)  and  the  net  issue  of loans
from  the  central  bank to the  private  sector  (LCbp).
In  most  cases,  the  capital  accounts  closure  rules  for  the  Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX
combine  a bindiing  foreign  saving  eonstraint  with either  a public  or private
sector  aggregate  demand  component  as the adjusting  variable, in addition  to
domestic  debt financing  of the  CPSD.- 28 -
TABLE 3.2
ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES  UNDER  ALTERNATIVE  CLOSURE  RULES
FOR THE  CAPITAL-ACCOUNT  BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
FOREIGN SAVING  CONSTRAINT
l.  Not  Binding  2.  Binding
Net  Foreign  Debt  Aggregate  Demand
A.  Public  Sector  Adjustment
ebt Financing  of CPSD  Net Foreign  Public  Debt  Public  Spending  and
and  Domestic  Public  Debt  Domestic  Public  Debt
Money Financing  of CPSD  Net Foreign  Public  Debt and  Public  Spending  and
Domestic Money  Domestic  Money
B.  Private  Sector  Adjustment
ebt Financing  of CPSD  Net Foreign  Private  Debt  and  Private  Spending  and
Domestic  Public  Debt  Domestic  Public  Debt
Money  Financing  of CPSD  Net  Foreign  Private  Debt and  Private  Spending  and
Domestic  Money  Domestic  Money
Note:  CPSD is the  Consolidated  Total  Public  Sector  Deficit.- 29  -
TABLE  3.3
SETS  OF  ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE
CLOSURE RULES  FOR THE  CAITAL-ACCOUNT  BUDGETCOTINTS
IN  THE ZIMBABWE RMSM-XX  MODEL
CLOSURE RULES  ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES  FOR SECTOR  BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
Foreign  Sector  CPSD  Budgetary  Other  Public  Central  Banking  Private
Saving  Adjust-  Financing  Government  Sector  Bank  Syatem  Sector
Binding  ment  (b)  (o)  (cb)  (b)  (p)
1.1  No  Public  Debt  LPb  Lebo  FAeb  Lbap  Lcbp
1.2  No  Public  Money  Lpb  Lcbo  FACb  Lbsp  CU
1.3  No  Private  Debt  Lcbb  Lcb.  Lcbp  Lbsp  Lfp
1.4  No  Private  Money  Lbb  Lebo  Cu  Lbsp  Lfp
2.1  Yes  Public  Debt  Cblfib  Lcbo  Lcbp  Lbsp  Lpb
2.2  Yes  Public  Money  Cb/  fib  Lebo  CU  Lbsp  *  Lpb
2.3  Yes  Private  Debt  Lcbb  Lebo  Lcbp  Lbsp  Cbfi  'b
2.4  Yes  Private  Money  LCbb  Lebo  Cu  Lbsp  Cb/ffb- 30 -
3.2  Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX  Closure  and  General  Equilibrium
As discussed  above  the  basic  choice  for  the  Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX  closure  used
in  most  simulations  in  sections  4  and  5  below  combines  a  positive  closure  for  the
income-expenditure,  asset  markets,  and  goods  market  blocks  with  a  binding  foreign
saving  constraint. In  addition,  either  the  public  or  private  sector  adjusts  and
domestic  debt is  used for financing  the  consolidated  public  sector  deficit.
Diagram  3.1 illustrates  the general  equilibrium  of the Zimbabwe  RMSM-XX
under this closure,  showing  the main intersectoral  linkages  of macroeconomic
variables  by main blocks.  Goods  markets determine  output,  the price level,
private  aggregate  demand  components  and  relative  prices. Private  consumption  is
determined  by  public  sector  saving  and  private  disposable  income,  which  come  from
the  budget  constraints. Private  fixed  investment  is  affected  by the  commercial
banks' loan rate (ibsp),  which is anchored  to the bond interest  rate (iBB)
determined  in the asset  markets.  Public  fixed investment,  determined  by the
budgetary  government  capital  account,  contributes  with private investment  to
output today (via aggregate  demand)  and tomorrow (by increasing  the capital
stock.)
Output  and aggregate  demand  levels  determined  by the goods  market  block
affect  in  turn  the  private  sector  budget  constraint  and  asset  demands. Interest
rates,  determined  by the asset  markets,  are influenced  in addition  by total
consolidated  public  sector  domestic  debt  (B),  which  comes  from  the  public  sector
budget constrairts.  Finally, interest rates feed back  into the budget
constraints.
Figure  3.1  illustrates the  joint  determination  of  4  of  the  main
macroeconomic  variables  in  our  model:  real  GDP,  the  GDP  price  level,  its  rate  of
inflation, and  the  real interest rate.  Panel I  illustrates the joint
determination  of the  first  two  variables  in  the  goods  markets  and  panel  IV  shows
the determination  of the real interest  rate paid on public domestic  debt,
consistent with  the  nominal  interest rate  determined by  the  monetary
base/domestic  public  debt  portfolio  composition,  for  a given  rate  of ex postDIAGRAM 3.1
CLOSURE  1*:
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FIGURE  3.1
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inflation. Panel  IV  puts  together  the  goods  market  (GM)  and  asset  markets  (AM)
equilibrium  conditions  shown  separately  in I and  III.
Figure  3.1 illustrates  a simple  exercise  of a generalized  nominal  shock.
As a result  of the  model's  homogeneity  of degree  I in all  prices  and nominal
variables, an  identical proportional increase in  all  exogenously  nominal
variables (exogenous  prices, asset stocks,  current-price  inter-sector  flows)
increases  endogenous  nominal  variables  !y  an  identical  amount,  without  affecting
real  variables.- 34 -
4.  BASE SCENARIO  SIMULATION  RESULTS
This section  presents  simulation  results  for  the 1988-1995  base scenario
which  combines  unchanged  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  with  a  mild,  transitory  oil
shock.  A  presentation  of  the  underlying  assumptions  is  followed  by  the  dicussion
of the simulation  results.9 It is important  to stress  that  the base scenario
results and  its  underlying  assumptions  comprise  a  "reasonable"  case  of
macroeconomic  development  in Zimbabwe  and hence do not constitute  at all a
projection  scenario.
4.1  Assumptions
The  1988-1995  simulation  scenario  encompasses  historical  1988,  preliminary
1989,  estimated  1990,  and  projected  or simulated  1991-1995  data.  The  various
sources  for  the  historical,  estimated  and  preliminary  1988-90  data  are  official
publications  (Reserve  Bank  of  Zimbabwe,  Ministry  of  Finance  of Zimbabwe  and  IMF
International  Financial Statistics),  recent World Bank and  IMF documents,
Zimbabwe  Resident  Mission  estimations,  and  our  own  estimations.  The  sources  for
1991-95  projections  of  exogenous  varialles  are  the  above  mentioned  World  Bank  and
IMF  papers  and  our own  projections. A detailed  presentation  and  discussion  of
the 1988-1995  data set of exogenous  variables  is presented  in Appendix  3.  A
summary discussion of the main closure, external, policy, and behavioral
assumptions  underlying  the  projection  of exogenous  variables  follows.
'  The model was run on a 386 Zenith  PC using Soritec  (release  6.4.023).
Because  this  release  of Soritec  is  unable  to  use  expanded  memory,  the  number  of
equations  used  in  the  model  is  limited  due  to  the  640K  memory  ceiling.  A  new  386
version  of  Soritec  has  been  released  which  promises  to  allow  larger  models  to  be
simulated. The  model  is comprised  of approximately  173  equations  (depending  on
the closure chosen), requiring  about 50 minutes of computer time to reach
convergence  for  the  eight-year  simulation  period.- 35 -
Closure  Rule
The  base  scenario  assumes  a  closure  which  combines  a  binding  foreign  saving
constraint,  public sector  adjustment,  and debt financing  of the consolidated
public  sector  deficit. This  corresponds  to  closure  rule  2.1  in table  3.3,  with
budgetary  fixed investment  selected  as the adjusting  public  sector  aggregate
demand  variable.
External  Variables
The  third  oil  price  shock  is  assumed  to  be a relatively  mild oas. Nominal
US$  oil  prices  are  projected  to increase  from  $16/b.  in 1989  to $23/b.  in 1990,
to  stay  there  in 1991  and 1992  and  increase  slightly  afterwards,  until  reaching
a level  of $26.2/b.  in 1995. Other  import  prices,  as  well as  export  prices,  are
projected  to increase  at 4.5%  per  year throughout  the 1990-95  period. Foreign
interest  rates  are  projected  to  remain  unchanged  from  their  1990  levels. Foreign
demand,  as reflected  by OECD  output  growth,  increases  at 3% per  year.  Foreign
financing,  which is  exogenous  under  the  binding  foreign  resource  closure,  would
increase  slightly  in 1991-95,  allowing an emergence  of slightly increasing
current  account  deficits,  up to 1.8%  of GDP  in 1995.
Exchange  Rate Policy
After  the  1989-90  real  devaluations,  a  crawling  peg  policy  is  assumed  for
the nominal exchange  rate during 1991-95,  consistent  with a "relative"  PPP
objective'"  and  a return  to a target  10%  annual  inflation.
Fiscal  Policv
Fiscal  policy  is  assumed  to  allow  a  3lightly  increasing  deficit  of  both  the
budgetary  and  other  public  sectors,  implying  a partial  reversal  of the 1987/88
fiscal  adjustment,  which brought  the consolidated  non-financial  public  sector
'0"Relative"  purchasing  power  parity  relates  rates  of  change  of  external  and
relevant  domestic  prices.- 36 -
deficit  down  to  9%  of  GDP. As  mentioned  above,  budgetary  fixed  investment  is  the
aggregate  demand  variable  which is adjusted  in response  to the foreign  saving
constraint.
Deficit  Financing  and  Monetary  Policy
The consolidated  total public sector deficit (CPSD)  continues to be
financed  mostly by domestic  debt issues.  Monetary  policy is conducted  with
prudence,  sustaining  a return  to  a 10%  annual  inflation  rate.
Structural  Adiustment  and  Productivity  Gains
No  significant  structural  adjustment  is  foreseen  in  the  bade  scenario. In
particular no  trade  reform is  envisioned.  However, significant annual
productivity  gains  of  0.9-1.0  percentage  points  of  GDP  are  assumed  to  take  place
throughout  1989-95.
WaRes
Real  labor  productivity-adjusted  uages  are  projected  to  decline  by  2.7Z  in
1989,  1.8%  in 1990  and 1%  in 1991,  being  maintained  thereafter. This  real  wage
adjustment  contributes  to slightly  higher  employment,  capacity  utilization  and
output  growth  during  1989-1991.
Private  Sector  Behavior
Private  sector  behavior  remains  unchanged  from  the 1980s,  as reflected  by
the  unalterei  coefficients  of  all  behavioral  equations  throughout  the  simulation
horizon.
4.2  Results
Table  4.1  summarizes  the  macroeconomic  outcome  as reflected  by the  set  of
key  macroeconomic  indicators  for  the  Zimbabwe  1988-95  base  scenario.  Tables  4.2
and  4.3  present  the  matrices  for  budgetary  and  income-expenditure  flows  for  1988- 37  -
TABLE 4.1
KEY MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS TABLE
ZIMBABWE  BASE SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988-1995
1938  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
REAL  GRONTH  RATES:
GOP  CH KGDP  0.066  0.049  0.027  0.032  0.035  0.038  0.039  0.040
Investment  CH KFI  0.053  0.263  -0.091  0.068  0.060  0.047  0.049  0.051
Exports  CH KEXP  0.018  0.045  0.028  0.031  0.034  0.036  0.037  0.038
GDP Per Capita  CHNKGOPPOP  0.035  0.020  -0.001  0.005  0.008  0.011  0.013  0.015
Conf.umption  per Capita  CH_KCPPOP  0.017  0.014  -0.004  -0.002  0.006  0.013  0.014  0.016
ICOR:  ICOR  1.78  2.35  5.10  3.88  3.63  3.46  3.37  3.29
AGGREGATE  DEMAND  COMPOSITION:
(as  share of  GDP)
Resource  Baelnce  RESBALGDP  0.037  0.014  -0.014  -0.011  -0.007  0.010  -0.012  -0.015
Exports  EXPGDP  0.312  0.338  0.362  0.369  0.372  0.371  0.370  0.369
Imports  IMPGOP  0.275  0.324  0.377  0.380  0.379  0.380  0.382  0.384
Total Consumption  C  TOTGDP  0.747  0.750  0.765  0.776  0.782  0.781  0.781  0.781
Private Consumption  CFGDP  0.517  0.520  0.530  0.536  0.540  0.540  0.540  0.541
Public Consumption  CGGDP  0.230  0.231  0.235  0.239  0.241  0.241  0.241  0.241
Gross Fixed Capital Investment  FIGDP  0.180  0.226  0.208  0.220  0.227  0.229  0.231  0.233
Private Invest  FIPGDP  0.090  0.126  0.105  0.114  0.121  0.123  0.125  0.127
Public Invest  FIGGOP  0.089  0.100  0.104  0.105  0.106  0.106  0.106  0.106
Change in Stocks  CHSTKGDP  0.036  0.010  0.041  0.016  -0.001  -0.000  0.000  0.001
Foreign  Saving  CAGDP  -0.004  0.021  0.049  0.047  0.042  0.043  0.044  0.046
National  Saving  SNATGDP  0.220  0.215  0.199  0.188  0.183  0.185  0.187  0.188
Private  Saving  SPGOP  0.219  C  '11  0.196  0.187  0.185  0.189  0.194  0.198
Public  Saving  SGGDP  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.007  .0.010
Marginal  National  Saving  MNSR  NA  0.105  -0.718  -0.132  0.075  0.217  0.213  0.206
PUBLIC  DEFICIT:
(as share of GOP)
Total Public  DEf PUBGDP  0.088  0.097  0.100  0.105  0.108  0.110  0.113  0.116
Budgetary  Gov't  DEFB3GDP  0.059  0.068  0.070  0.074  0.076  0.078  0.081  0.083
Other Public  DEf_OTHCDP  0.028  0.029  0.030  0.031  0.031  0.032  0.032  0.033
PRICES  AND INTEREST  RATES:
Nominal  Avg Exchange  Rate  EE  1.806  2.113  2.470  2.600  2.737  2.881  3.033  3.192
Real E-rate Index ('88u100)  RER  100.OCO  91.697  74.681  74.772  75.520  75.601  75.665  75.697
Inflation  INFL  0.119  0.127  0.139  0.080  0.090  0.101  0.101  0.101
Nom. Deposit Rate  lowM  0.083  0.086  0.088  0.091  0.093  0.096  0.099  0.102
Real Loan Rate (ex-post)  LOANRATE  0.010  0.002  -0.008  0.048  0.042  0.034  0.037  0.041
Nom. Public  Debt Interest  Rate  IB8  0.133  0.132  0.132  0.136  0.139  0.142  0.146  0.149
MONEY AND DOMESTIC  DEBT:
(as share of GOP)
Monetary Base  STK  MONGDP  0.077  0.077  0.078  0.080  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081
Ml  STKM1GDP  0.151  0.151  0.154  0.157  0.159  0.159  0.158  0.158
Quasi Money  STK0QMGDP  0.175  0.175  0.179  0.182  0.184  0.184  0.184  0.184
Domestic Debt  STK_BGDP  0.474  0.469  0.481  0.513  0.539  0.560  0.582  0.604
BALANCE  OF PAYMENTS:
(US S  Million)
Resource Batance  D RESBAL  218.2  84.6  -83.9  -69.1  -49.1  -71.9  -99.1  -130.2
Wet Foreign  Factor Income  DNFY  -198.0  -188.9  -197.5  -214.2  -222.7  -231.7  -240.8  -250.3
Transfers  D TRANS  5.0  -18.3  -13.1  -13.8  -14.4  -14.9  -15.4  -16.4
Current  Account  D.CA  25.2  -122.6  -294.5  -297.1  -286.2  -318.4  -355.3  -396.9
Official  Capita' Grants  D  CGRANT  59.1  53.9  82.0  87.0  92.0  95.5  99.0  102.5
LT Capital Inflows  D KINFLOW  -194.9  104.9  108.2  114.9  120.3  120.8  121.2  121.7
Total Other Items  0 OTHER  188.6  43.7  200.1  152.9  130.3  157.4  189.1  225.5
Net  IMPF  Credit  DJIMFCREDI  -85.0  -40.0  -23.0  -8.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Change In  Gross Reserves  Cd_DFRES  7.0  47.5  -72.8  -49.7  -56.4  -55.2  -54.0  -52.8
INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES AND DEBT:
Stock of Gross Reserves (USS Mn)  OFRES  295.2  244.7  316.0  365.5  421.7  476.6  530.3  582.7
Total  External Debt (USS Mn)  DFOEST TOT  2670.6  2728.0  2812.8  2928.4  3052.0  3175.4  3298.8  3422.2
Net Reserves (months  irports)  FRESIMP  1.8  1.4  1.7  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2
Total External Debt/GDP Ratio  DE8TGOP  0.487  0.493  0.484  0.476  0.463  0.443  0.424  0.404- 38 -
TABLE 4.2
SECTOR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND-INCOMEIEXPENDITURE EQUATION BY
CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS  : ZIMBABWE,  1988
(As Percentage of 1988  GDP)
0523111?  Budgeay  Ohe  ulc  centrol  BaiigPrivate  External  National  Total
ACCOUNT  0Ovm'  Sector  Bank  system  Sector  Sec tor  Accounts  sources
Budgetary  Nob  1.13  Residcb  0.56  Td  16.87  COGb  0  Yfb  0  36.72
Governmeut  Ti  9.16
OthI  9.00  -Subb, 0
Other  Public  Tfbo 4.41  COGo  0  DRS  -0.22  4.19
Sector  __  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _Subo  0  _  _  _  _  _
Central  Nbcb 0.37  Nocb  0.22  tNbacb -0.04  Npcb  0  NlAcb  0.17  0.72
Bank
Banking  Nbbe  0.47  Nobe  0.80  NRo.  0  Npbe  1.88  NiAbe  0.02  3.17 S,et  ea__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _
private  Thp  4.42  Top  0  NNOLcb .0.05  N"(  1.26  Tfp  0.08  Yfp  91.06  102.39
Sector  Nbp  3.43  NoF  0.31  NI4OLBS  0.34  COOp  0
_______________  ~~~~~~~~  ~~~~Residb,  1.54  ________
External  Nbf  1.81  Nof  0.38  NFLcb  0.04  NFLbs  0.07  Npf  0.35  .EXP  31  .25  -0.15
Sector;  NIMP  0.17  NSpf  0.42  Imp  27.54
PR  0.32
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  NR ei  0  _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _ _  __n_i_  _
National  Cb  23.02  Co  0  Scb  0  Sb.  0  Cp  51.69  Sf  -0.43  96.30
Accounts  Sb  .1.21  So  1.36  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Sp  21.87  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ______
Total  36.72  4.2  0.72  3.17  102.40  -0.16  96.29 uses
CAPITAL  *  Bu,getary  OtherPbi  Central  banking  Private  External  National  Total ACCOUNT  Oovt  Sector  Bank  spetem  Sector  Sect.r  Accounts  Sources
Bdgetary  ILcbb  -0.30  Lbeb  1.73  Lpb  3.70  ROGb  1.'00  Sb  -1.21  f.23
Government  *  Lfb  1.31  _  ___
Other  Public  Lbo  1.49  ILcba  -0,29  Lbeo  0.58  Lpo  1.06  KOGO  0  So  1.36  4.20
Sector  L fo  0  _____
Cenitral  Bank  Res  0.69  NOLob  -1.06  FLcb  -0.14  Scb  0  -0.49
Cu  1.07  RFLcb  0.09
IMP  -1.44
____________  _______________  ~~~~~  ~~~~~  ~~RIMP  0.30  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Banking  Lobbe  -0.46  Q(  2.26  FLb.  0.02  Sb.  0  7.27 system  "I  3.55  RLbsh  0.16
___  ___  __  ___  _  ___  __  ___  _____  ___  __  ___  __  NOLbe  1.74  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Private  Lcbp  0  Lbsp  3.08  lOOp  0  SP  21.87  *  23.89
Sector  DFI  0.07
Lf;p  -45
Knel  0
_____________  ____________  10~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~E  2  .72  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
External  FAcb  -0.15  FAba  0.04  Sf  .0.43  0.24
Sector  _______  _  _  _  _RFAc  b  0.71  RPAbe  0.07  _  ______  ________
National  lb  4.74  lo  4.19  9.04  21.60
Accounts  __  __  ___  ___  __tk  3  63  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Total  6.23  4.19  .0.49  7.26  23.92  0.24  21.59
Uses- 39  -
TABLE  4.3
SECTOR BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS  AND INCOME/EXPENDITURE  EQUATION  BY
CURRENT  AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS.  SOURCES  AND USES OF FUNDS:  ZIMBABWE.  1995
(As  Percentaae  of 1995  GDP)
CUUIZIT  Budgetary  Other  Public  Central  Banking  Private  External  National  Total
ACCOUNT  Gov  Sector  Bank  System  Sector  Soctor  Accounts  Sources 
Budgetary  Nob  1.32  Resldeb  0.49  Td  17.72  COGb  0  Yfb  0  38.61
coverrnent  OthI  9.46  Ti  9.62
-Subb  0
Other  Public  Tho  4.64  COGo  0  DRS  -0.23  4.41
Sector  Subo  0
Central  Nbcb  0.34  Noob  0.05  Nbsecb  -0.09  Npcb  -0.17  NPAcb  0.22  0.35
Bank
Banking  Nbbe  0.71  Nob.  0.90  NRac  0  Npbe  2.31  INAbe  0.02  3.94 Slst*:-
Private  Tbp  4.65  Top  0  NNOLcb  -0.17  NM  1.64  Tfp  -0.19  Tfp  90.61  104.16
Sector  Nbp  4.84  Nap  0.45  NNOLBS  0.59  COTp  0
Residba  1.74
External  Nbf  1.78  Nof  0.28  NFLcb  0.03  NFLbs  0.06  Npf  0.13  .Exp  36.85  4.62
Sector  NIHF  0  NSpf  0.51  IMp  38.35
PR  0.33
NRnei  0
National  Cb  24.08  Co  0  Scb  0  Sb  0  Cp  54.06  Sf  4.57  101.50
Accounts  Sb  -2.4  2  So  1.42  Sp  19.79
Total  38.62  4.42  0.35  3.94  104.14  4.62  101.50
CAPITAL  Bugetary  Other  Public  Central  Banking  Private  External  National  Tot*l
ACCOUNT  ovt  Sector  BanI  System  Sector  Sector  Accounts  Sources
Budgetar,  Lebb  0.34  Lbeb  0.71  Lpb  6.76  SOGb  1.18  Sb  -2.42  7.56
Covernment  Lfb  0.99
Other  Public  Lbo  1.69  Lebo  0.26  Lbco  0.90  Lpo  0.45  KOGo  0  So  1.42  4.72
Sector  Lfo  0
Central  Bank  Rot  0.39  NOLcb  -0.20  FLeb  0.02  Scb  0  0.86
Cu  0.63  RPLcb  0.02
IMF  0
____________  _____________  ______________  RIMRHF 0
Banking  Lcbba  .0.12  I  2.31  FLbe  0.04  Sb.  0  4.95
System  .i  1.99  RFLbe  0.05
_____________  ~~~~~~NOLbo  0.68
Private  Lcbp  .0.47  Lbep  2.24  ROGp  0  Sp  19.79  24.76




_____________  ____________  _____________  _____________  tO  2.56  _____________  _________~~~~~EO  2  .5
Extsrnal  PAcb  0.55  FAbe  0.06  Sf  4.57  5.50
Sector  RFAcb  0.29  RFAbe  0.03
Nationsl  lb  5.88  lo  4 .72  Ip  12.71  23.36
Accounts  _  Cbtk  0.05
Total  7.57  4.72  0.86  4.96  24.75  _  .50  23.36Figure  4.1
Base  Scenario:  Output/Capital  and
Potential  Output/Capital  Ratios
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and 1995,  respectively.' 1 Appendix  4 presents  the complete  set of endogenous
variables  and  budget  constraints  for  the  base scenario.
After two exceptionally  good years (1988-89),  growth dips in 1990 in
response  to the  "mild"  oil  shock,  recovering  afterwards  to rates  which  converge
to 4.0% in 1995.  Higher  growth in the latter  years results both from the
reversal  of the  oil  shock  and  higher  capital  formation. 1990-95  average  annual
GDP growth  of 3.7% is substantially  higher  than  the historical  average  annual
2.4%  achieved  during  1982-88,  as a  result  of assuming  both  declining  real  wages
and  productivity  gains  during  the  simulation  period.  Productivity  gains  also
contribute  to  the  strong  trend  in  private  investment  during  1990-95,  with year-
to-year  fluctuations  due  to  changes  in  relative  investment  goods  prices  and  real
interest  rates. Figure  4.1  illustrates  the  1979-95  evolution  of  output/capital
and  potential  output/capital  ratios.
Higher  available  foreign  financing  --  a  partial  relaxation  of the  external
resource  constraint  --  allows  the  emergence  of  slowly  increasing  current  account
deficits, tv .lmost 5% in 1990, which decline somewhat thereafter.  The
deterioration  in  the  current  account  is  more  than  reflected  by the  decline  in  the
resource  surplus  as  a  share  of  GDP,  due  to  decreasing  foreign  interest  payments.
Per  capita  private  consumption,  after  declining  slightly  in 1990  and  1991,
grows at increasing  rates afterwards,  reaching  a 1.6% growth rate in 1995.
Private  fixed  investment  takes  the  brunt  of  private  sector  adjustment  to  both  the
1990  oil  shock  and  the  1990  devaluation  of the  Zimbabwe  dollar,  as reflected  in
its  negative  response  to  increasing  PLp  caused  primarily  by  higher  import  prices.
With the  oil  price  reversion  in 1991-95,  private  investment  recovers.
After  the  significant  corrective  real  devaluations  of 1989-90  and  the  1990
oil shock,  the  real  exchange  rate,  defined  as the  ratio  of  the  GDP  deflator  and
the  aggregate  import  deflator  (which  includes  the  price  of oil)  appreciates
11  These  two  matrices  present  1988  and  1995  flows  from  the  budget  constraint
tables of  appendix 4,  as percentage of each year's GDP.  Matrices for
intermediate  simulation  years  1989-94 can be easily constructed  from the
information  provided  in appendix  4.Figure  4.2
Base Scenario:  Real Wage and
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slightly  during  1990-95,  in  tandem  with the  decline  in  the  price  of oil  and  the
increasing  current  account  deficits. Figure  4.2  depicts  the evolution  of the
real  wage and the  real  exchange  rate  during  1979-1995.
The  domestic  counterpart  of  a  more relaxed  foreign  saving  constraint  is a
reduction  in both private and public sector surpluses.  The public deficit
increases  by 2.8 percentage  points  of GDP between  1988 and 1995,  a result  of
falling public  saving  (-1.1x) and  increasing public  investment (1.7%).
Similarly,  private  saving  falls  by 2.1  percentage  points  of GDP  while private
investment  increases  by 3.7  percentage  points. Not surprisingly,  the rapidly
growing  deficit  is  financed  through  foreign  saving  which  increases  to  4.6%  of  GDP
by 1995,  up from  0% in 1988.
Despite  stronger  inflationary  financing  of  public  deficits  during  1989  and
1990,  when domestic (GDP deflator) inflation  shot up to 12.7% and 13.9%,
respectively,  the  total  net  domestic  debt  to  output  ratio  still  rose  from  47.4%
in 1988  to 48.1%  in 1990. A return  to 9-10%  annual  inflation  rates  in 1991-95
further  raises  the  need  for  domestic  debt  financing,  which  pushes  domestic  debt
to  GDP  ratios  systematically  up,  reaching  a  60.4%  level  in 1995. Consequently,
the  nominal  rate  on  domestic  debt  rises  from  13.2%  in  1990  to 14.9%  in 1995. The
Ml  and  quasi  money  ratios  to  GDP  are  projected  to  be relatively  stable  over  1988-
95. Hence  the  increase  in  the  deposit  rate,  determined  by  the  ratio  between  the
two latter  variables,  is only  due to GDP growth,  which affects  positively  the
desired  ratio  of Ml and quasi  money.
The  balance  of  payments  reflects  the  higher  capital  inflows  assumed  by  the
base  scenario,  which  allow  the  development  of  rapidly  increasing  current  account
deficits  mentioned  above,  while IMF  credits  are repaid  and gross  reserves  are
accumulated.  In  fact,  gross  reserves  in  US$  are  nearly  doubled  between  1988  and
1995,  allowing  an increase  in  net  reserves  from  the  equivalent  of 1.8  months  of
imports  in 1988  to 2.2  months  of imports  in 1995.
Low current account deficits  and moderate GDP growth are behind the
significant  decline  in  the  total  external  debt  to  GDP  ratio,  from  48.8Z  in 1988- 44 -
to 40.4% in 1995,  which contributes  to a decline in the burden  of interest
payments  and a  potential  recovery  in Zimbabwe's  external  creditworthiness.- 45  -
5.  ADJUSTMENT UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
This  section  discusses  simulation  results  for  two  alternative  scenarios  to
the  base  scenario  presented  above. The  first  cor.qiders  the  effects  of  a  stronger
oil shock in 1991 and the second  shows the macroeconomic  implications  of a
sustained  fiscal  adjustment  effort.
5.1  Strong  Oil  Shock  Scenario
The  strong  oil  shock  scenario  assumes  a lingering  continuation  throughout
1991-92  of  market  uncertainties  caused  by the  1990-91  gulf  crisis,  implying  that
the  nominal  oil  price  is  maintained  at  an  average  value  of $33/b,  which  is  $10/b
higher  than  what the  base  scenario  assumes. In 1993-95  the  oil  price  declines
steadily,  reaching  in 1995  the level  assumed  in the  base  scenario  ($26.2/b).
Two alternative  closure  rules  are considered  for this case.  The first
assumes  no foreign  resource  constraint,  with  foreign  loans  to the  private  sector
adjusting to meet the additional  financing  needs (if any), after domestic
adjustment  to  the  stronger  oil  shock. Under  the  second  alternative  (with  binding
foreign  saving),  foreign  financing  stays  unchanged  from  the  base  scenario  levels,
with private  fixed investment  responding  endogenously  to meet the adjustment
requirements  (if  any),  after  domestic  adjustment  to the  price  shock." 2
An oil shock has two contractionary  effects  on output  in the Zimbabwe
RMSM-XX  model. The first  one  is  a price  effect  which  acts  on aggregate  supply.
The second is an income  effect  with an impact  on aggregate  demand." 3 First,
12  The first  closure  corresponds  to alternative  1.3  listed  in table  3.3,
while  the  second  is  consistent  with  closure  2.3  of  table  3.3,  with private  fixed
investment  as the aggregate  demand  variable  adjusting  to the foreign  saving
constraint.  Hence,  the  distinction  between  the  latter  case  and  the  base  scenario
closure of section 4 is that now private,  as opposed to public, investment
adjusts  to available  foreign  resources.
"3  A third  effect  of an oil shock  --  an expansionary  substitution  effect
via aggregate  demand  --  could  be at work if short-run  demand  for intermediate
imports  responded  to relative  prices. While  this  is the  case  of the  estimated
intermediate  import  demand  presented  in our companion  paper,  we set the cor-
responding  coefficient  to  zero  in  our  simulation  model  (See  line  4, table  2.3.).- 46 -
higher intermediate  goods prices raise production  costs and hence depress
aggregate  supply,  resulting  in  a  depreciation.  The  second  contractionary  effect
occurs  when foreign  financing  is constrained. Since the price of change  of
stocks  was chosen  as the  adjusting  price  deflator,  rising  intermediate  import
prices imply a higher  Ph,*  and higher  expenditure  on current-price  inventory
accumulation.  Consequently,  the  flow-of-funds  restriction  of  the  private  sector
capital  account  forces  the private  sector's  adjusting  variable,  private  fixed
investment,  to decrease  accordingly.
Tab'le  5.1  summarizes  Zimbabwe's  macroeconomic  indicators  us.der  the  strong
oil shock  scenario,  when the  adverse  shock  can  be accommodated  through  foreign
financing  due  to  a  non-binding  foreign  resource  constraint.  The  strong,  although
transitory,  oil shock  is slightly  contractionary,  as can  be inferred  from  the
decline in 1991 growth (and subsequent  recovery),  as compared  to the base
scenario  growth  rates  in  table  4.1.  1991  growth  declines  from  3.2%  in the  base
scenario  to 2.9% under the strong  oil shock,  with slightly  stronger  1993-95
growth  recovery  under  the  oil  shock  scenario,  when oil  prices  decline  to reach
base  scenario  levels  in 1995.
While  some of the  adjustment  is borne  by falling  private  investment  --  a
contractionary  effect  --  the  existence  of  unlimited  foreign  financing  mitigates
the  contraction. Hence,  the  large  increase  in  the  value  of  imports  necessitates
a  massive  foreign  financing  of  the  oil  shock:  long-term  capital  inflows  increase
in 1991 from  $114.9  m. in the base scenario  to $588.3  m under the strong  oil
shock case, reflecting  the huge increase  in loans from foreign to private
sectors.  The  real  exchange  rate  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  GDP  deflator  and  the
total  imports  deflator  depreciates  substantially  in  1991  --  by  14.6%  --
recovering  steadily  afterwards  to  reach  almost  the  base scenario  level  in 1995.
Let's  turn  now to the  simulation  results  of the strong  oil  shock  under  a
binding  foreign  resource  constraint  (results  in  table  5.2). Due  to the  latter,
official  capital inflows  and the current  account  are identical  to the base
scenario  values  throughout  1991-95. This  implies  that  private  fixed  investment- 47  -
TABLE  5.1
KEY MACROECONOMIC  INOICATORS  TABLE
ZINPABIE  STRONG  OIL SHOCK  SCENARIO
hO FOREIGN  SAVING  CONSTRAINT
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988-1995
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
REAL  GROWTH  RATES:
GOP  CH  KGDP  0.066  0.049  0.027  0.029  0.034  0.038  0.039  0.041
Investment  CH%KFI  0.053  0.263  -0.091  0.052  0.056  0.054  0.054  0.056
Exports  CH$KEXP  0.018  0.045  0.028  0.029  0.033  0.036  0.037  0.038
GDP  PFr  Capita  CH  KGDPPOP  0.035  0.020  -0.001  0.002  0.007  0.012  0.013  0.016
Consuaption  per  Capita  CHNKCPPOP  0.017  0.014  -0.004  0.002  0.007  0.011  0.013  0.015
ICOR:  ICOR  1.78  2.35  5.10  4.23  3.72  3.37  3.30  3.23
AGGREGATE  DENAND  CONMPSITION:
(as share  of  GDP)
Resource B3alnce  RESUALCOP  0.037  0.014  -0.014  *0.085  -0.105  -0.075  -0.055  *0.037
EAports  EXPGOP  0.312  0.338  0.362  0.363  0.363  0.365  0.365  0.366
Imports  IMPGOP  0.275  0.324  0.377  0.447  0.469  0.440  0.421  0.403
Total  Consurption  C TOTGOP  0.747  0.7T0  0.765  0.765  0.768  0.771  0.774  0.777
Private  Consumptlon  CPGDP  0.517  0.520  0.530  0.530  0.532  0.534  0.536  0.538
PubLic  ConsuRption  CGGDP  0.230  0.231  0.235  0.235  0.236  0.237  0.238  0.239
Gross  Fixed  Capitat  Investment  FIGDP  0.180  0.226  0.208  0.213  0.218  0.223  0.227  0.231
Private  Invest  FIPGDP  0.090  0.126  0.105  0.109  0.114  0.119  0.122  0.126
Public  Invest  FIGCOP  0.089  0.100  0.104.  0.104  0.104  0.104  P.105  0.105
Change  in  Stocks  CHSTKGOP  0.036  0.010  0.041  0.106  0.119  0.081  0.054  0.029
Foreign  Saving  CAGMP  -0.004  0.021  0.049  0.120  0.140  0.109  0.087  0.068
National  Saving  SNATGOP  0.220  0.215  0.199  0.199  U.198  0.196  0.194  0.193
Private  Saving  SPGDP  0.219  0.211  0.196  0.198  0.198  0.19;  0.200  0.201
PubLic  Saving  SGGDP  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.001  -0.000  -0.003  -0.005  -0.008
Marginal  National  Saving  MNSR  MA  0.105  -0.718  -0.239  0.062  0.260  0.238  0.223
PUBLIC  DEFICIT:
(as  share of  GOP)
Total  Public  DEF  PUGOP  0.088  0.097  0.100  0.102  0.104  0.107  0.110  0.114
Budgetary Gov't  DEF.WOGOP  0.059  0.068  0.070  0.072  0.073  0.076  0.078  0.081
Other  Public  OEF  OTHCOP  0.028  0.029  0.030  0.030  0.031  0.031  0.032  0.032
PRICES  AND  INTEREST  RATES:
Nominal  Avg  Exchange  Rate  EE  1.806  2.113  2.470  2.600  2.737  2.881  3.033  3.192
Real  E-rate  Index  (t88u100)  RER  100.000  91.697  74.681  63.895  61.620  65.897  69.220  72.428
InfLation  INFL  0.119  0.127  0.139  0.100  0.097  0.095  0.096  0.095
Nom. Deposit  Rate  law  0.083  0.086  0.088  0.091  0.093  0.096  0.099  0.102
Real Loan Rate (ex-post)  LOANRATE  0.010  0.002  .0.008  0.030  0.035  0.040  0.042  0.045
Mom.  Public  Oebt  Interest  Rate  1BS  0.133  0.132  0.132  0.136  0.139  0.142  0.145  0.148
MONEY  AND  OOMESTIC  DEBT:
(as  share  of  GDP)
Monetary  Base  STK  MNGOP  0.077  0.077  0.078  0.079  0.079  0.080  0.080  0.080
Hi  STK.M1GOP  0.151  0.151  0.154  0.155  0.156  0.156  0.157  0.157
Quasi Money  STK MGOP  0.175  0.175  0.179  0.180  0.181  0.181  0.182  0.183
Domestic  Debt  ST  KBGDP  0.474  0.469  0.481  0.504  0.526  0.548  0.571  0.595
EALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS:
(US  S MiLLion)
Resource Salance  0 RESSAL  218.2  84.6  -83.9  -542.5  *727.3  -562.2  -445.6  -324.6
Net foreign  Factor  Incom  O NFY  -19W.0  -188.9  -197.5  -214.2  -222.7  -231.7  -240.8  -250.3
Transfers  D  TANS  5.0  -18.3  -13.1  *13.8  -14.4  -14.9  -15.4  -16.4
Current  Account  O CA  25.2  -122.6  -294.5  -770.5  -964.4  -808.7  -701.9  -591.3
Official  Capital  Grants  CKGRANT  59.1  S3.9  82.0  87.0  92.0  95.5  99.0  102.5
LT Capital  Inflowe  D KINFLOW  -194.9  104.9  108.2  588.3  798.5  611.1  467.8  316.2
Total  Other  Items  DOTNER  188.6  -43.7  200.1  152.9  130.3  157.4  189.1  225.5
Net  IMF Credit  D  ONFCREDI  -85.0  *40.0  -23.0  -8.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Change  In  Gross Reserves  CI  DTRES  7.0  47.5  -72.8  -49.7  *56.4  -55.2  *54.0  -52.8
INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES  AND  ODET:
Stock  of  Gross Reserves (USS Mn)  DFRES  295.2  244.7  316.0  365.5  421.7  476.6  530.3  582.7
Totel  Externat  Debt  tUSS Mn)  OFOEST  TOT  2670.6  2728.0  2812.8  3401.8  4179.9  4737.2  5129.1  5355.4
Net  Reserves (month"  Isports)  FRESIMN  1.8  1.4  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.8  1.9  2.0
Total  External  Debt/GDP  Ratio  DEETGOP  0.487  0.493  0.484  0.545  0.621  0.652  0.653  0.629- 43 
TABLE  5.2
KEY  MACROECONOMIC  INOICATORS  TAULE
ZIMPAIWE  STRONG  OIL SHOCK  SCENARIO
FORE 
M SAVING  CONSTRAINT
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988-1995
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
REAL  GRWTH  RATES:
GOP  CH  KGOP  0.066  0.049  0.027  0.001  0.007  0.024  0.030  0.036
Inv"tment  CH  KFt  0.053  0.263  *0.091  -0.343  -0.172  0.278  0.190  0.179
Exports  CH  KEXP  0.018  0.045  0.028  0.008  0.012  0.026  0.030  0.035
GDP  Per Capita  CH  KGDPPOP  0.035  0.020  -0.001  -0.025  -0.019  -0.002  0.003  0.011
Conswution  per  Capita  CH_.CPPOP  0.O0?  0.014  -0.004  -0.032  -0.019  0.003  0.008  0.015
ICOR:  ICOR  1.78  2.35  5.10  82.50  11.53  2.75  2.80  2.66
AGGREGATE  DEMAND  COMPOSITION:
("  share  of  GOP)
Resource  talance  REStALGOP  0.037  0.014  .0.014  *0.012  -0.008  -0.010  *0.013  -0.016
Exports  EXPGOP  0.312  0.338  0.362  0.380  0.384  0.377  0.370  0.364
Inports  IMPGDP  0.275  0.324  0.377  0.391  0.392  0.387  0.383  0.380
Total  Consumption  C TOTGOP  0.747  0.750  0.765  0.792  0.798  0.784  0.772  0.763
Private  Consumption  CPGOP  0.517  0.520  0.530  0.547  0.552  0.543  0.536  0.530
Public  Consumption  CGGOP  0.230  0.231  0.235  0.245  0.246  0.241  0.237  0.233
Gross Fixed Capital  Investment  FIGOP  0.180  0.226  0.208  0.140  0.115  0.142  0.162  0.182
Private  Invest  FIPGOP  0.090  0.126  0.105  0.032  0.006  0.036  0.058  0.080
Pubtic  Invest  FIGGOP  0.089  0.100  0.104  0.108  0.109  0.106  0.104  0.103
Charne in  Stocks  CHSTKGOP  0.036  0.010  0.041  0.080  0.095  0.085  0.079  0.071
Foreign  Saving  CAGOP  -0.004  0.021  0.049  0.050  0.046  0.046  0.047  0.048
National  Saving  qNATGDP  0.220  0.215  0.199  0.170  0.164  0.180  0.193  0.205
Private  Saving  SPGOP  0.219  0.211  0.196  0.161  0.147  0.159  0.167  0.174
Public  Saving  SGGOP  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.009  0.017  0.022  0.027  0.031
Marginal  National  Saving  MNSR  NA  0.105  -0.718  27.350  -0.821  0.863  0.655  0.554
PUBLIC  DEFICIT:
(as  share of  GOP)
Total  Public  DEF  PUBGDP  0.088  0.097  0.100  O.0  0.C092  0.084  0.078  0.072
Buogetary Gov't  DEFBUDGDP  0.059  0.068  0.070  0.068  0.062  0.056  0.051  0.047
Other Public  DEF_OTHCGDP  0.028  0.029  0.030  0.031  0.030  0.028  0.027  0.025
PRICES  AND  INTEREST  RATES:
Nominal  Avg  Exchange  Rate  EE  1.806  2.113  2.470  2.600  2.737  2.881  3.033  3.192
Real E-rate  Index  ('88:100)  RER  100.000  91.697  74.681  60.701  57.596  64.014  69.150  74.139
Inflation  INFL  0.119  0.127  0.139  0.057  0.092  0.124  0.120  0.117
Nom. Deposit  Rate  IWIN  0.083  0.086  0.088  0.088  0.089  0.091  0.093  0.096
Real Loan Rate (ex-post)  LOANRATE  0.010  0.002  -0.008  0.070  0.036  0.005  0.007  0.007
Man. Public  Debt  interest  Rate  fBB  0.133  0.132  0.132  0.134  0.134  0.133  0.131  0.128
MONEY  AND  DOMESttC  DEBT:
(as  share of  GOP)
Monetary Base  STK  MONGDP  0.077  0.077  0.078  0.084  0.087  0.087  0.086  0.085
Ml  STKN11DP  0.151  0.151  0.154  0.165  0.172  0.170  0.169  0.167
Ouasi Money  STK  QMGDP  0.175  0.175  0.179  0.192  0.199  0.197  0.196  0.193
Damestic Debt  STK_SGDP  0.474  0.469  0.481  0.528  0.546  0.534  0.517  0.495
BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS:
(US S Million)
Resource Balance  D RESSAL  218.2  84.6  -83.9  -69.1  -49.1  -71.9  -99.1  -130.2
Net Foreign  Factor  Incom  D NFY  -198.0  -188.9  -197.5  -214.2  -222.7  -231.7  -240.8  -250.3
tramfers  D TRANS  5.0  -18.3  -13.1  -13.8  -14.4  -14.9  -15.4  -16.4
Current  Account  D CA  25.2  *122.6  -294.5  -297.1  -286.2  -318.4  -355.3  -396.9
Official  Capital  Grants  D KGRANT  59.1  53.9  82.0  87.0  92.0  95.5  99.0  102.5
LT Capitat  Inflows  D  KINFLOW  -194.9  104.9  108.2  114.9  120.3  120.8  121.2  121.7
Total  Other  Items  DOTHER  18a.6  -43.7  200.1  152.9  130.3  157.4  189.1  225.5
Net  IMf  Credit  D IMFCREDIT  -85.0  -40.0  -23.0  -8.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Change In Gross  Reserves  CF_DFRES  7.0  47.5  -72.8  -49.7  -56.4  -55.2  -54.0  -52.8
INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES  ANO  DEBT:
Stock  of  Gross  Reserves (USS  Mn)  OFRES  295.2  244.7  316.0  365.5  421.7  476.6  530.3  582.7
Total  External  Debt  CUSS  Mn)  OFOESt  TOT  2670.6  2728.0  2812.8  2928.4  3052.0  3175.4  3298.8  3422.2
Net  Reserves (months imports)  FRESIMP  1.8  1.4  1.7  1.9  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.3
Total  External  Debt/GOP  Ratio  DESTGDP  0.487  0.493  0.484  0.501  0.500  0.476  0.451  0.426Figure  5.1
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must  contribute  to  the  domestic  adjustment,  substituting  for  the  lack  of foreign
lending.  While  public  investment  remains  relatively  constant,  private  investment
declines  precipitously. In the  base  case scenario,  private  investment  in 1991
was  approximately  11.4X of GDP.  Under the strong oil shock scenario  with
constrained  foreign  resources,  private  investment  falls  to only 3.2%  of GDP in
1991  and  even  further  in 1992. Consequently,  the  net  effect  is  a  deep  recession
with  almost no  real GDP  growth in  1991 and  only 0.7% growth in  1992.
Furthermore,  because  of the  reduction  in investment,  future  growth  is hampered
and  although  oil  prices  decline  at  the  end  of the  simulation  horizon,  GDP  growth
never  returns  to the  base  case levels.
Figures  5.1 and 5.2 present the evolution  of GDP growth and the real
exchange  rate for  the  three  scenarios  during  1988-95.
5.2  Fiscal  Adiustment  Scenario
Zimbabwe's authorities  have announced their intention to  engage in
substantial  fiscal  stabilization  over  the  following  years,  which  is  required  for
both macroeconomic stabilization  and  private sector expenditure recovery
objectives. In accordance  with this announcement,  here we consider  a fiscal
policy adjustment involving both the budgetary government and  the public
enterprises  (or  the  other  public  sector).
Budgetary  adjustment  will rely  in  our  simulation  exclusively  on a decline
in government  consumption,  which  will gradually  decline  from  the  23-24%  of GDP
level  in 1991-95  in the  no-fiscal  adjustment  base scenario,  to 23.5%,  starting
ir.  1991,  falling  to 22.7%  of GDP  in 1995  in  the fiscal  adjustment  scenario.
Public  enterprise  adjustment  will involve  an increase  in their  operating
aurplus  (DRS),  a  result  of  a  fiscal  reform  promoting  higher  efficiency  levels  in
public-owned  firms. DRS  is  flat  and  close  to  zero  in  the  base  scenario;  here  we
project  a gradual  increase  over  time,  starting  with a level  of 0.4% of GDP in
1991  to  reach  a  2.7%  of  GDP in  1995. Higher  operating  surpluses  can  be achieved
either  by increasing  production  for  a given  level  of factor  use, or by cutting- 52 -
wages  or  employment  without  affecting  production  levels,  or,  more realistically,
by  any  combination of  the  two  previous alternatives.  Here we  assume
conservatively  that all efficiency  gains  will rely on cutting  employment  or
wages.  This implies  that CDP  will not increase  directly  by this  measure,  and
hence  the  higher  operating  surplus  is simply  displacing  privete  sector  income.
With regard  to the  foreign  saving  closure,  we simulate  only  the  case  of a
binding  foreign  resource  constraint,  as fiscal  adjustment  liberalizes  domestic
resources,  which  we don't  want to  be used in  paying  back foreign  debt."
Table  5.3  presents  the  macroeconomic  outcome  of the fiscal  stabilization
program. Short-run  GDP  growth  is  marginally  below  the  base-case  projection  due
to the  contractionary  effect  of reduced  fiscal  spending. The  real  exchange  rate
remains  almost  unaltered  and the  balance  of payments  remains  identical  to the
base scenario  results  in table 4.1, the latter  due to the unchanged  foreign
resource  constraint.
The  increase in budgetary saving has a  positive effect on  private
consumption  due to the direct  crowding  out effect  of public  sector  eaving  on
private  saving,  reflected  by the  private  consumption  function. In addition  the
higher  other  public  sector  saving,  resulting  from  increased  DRS, has also the
same direct  positive  effect  on private consumption. However,  the latter  is
partially  offset  by the  effect  of lower  private  disposable  income,  which falls
with the  higher  public  enterprise  operating  surplus.
The combined result of the three effects on private consumption  is
positive;  however,  the  decline  in  constant-price  public  (budgetary)  consumption
is less  than  compensated  by higher  constant-price  private  consumption."
12 As in the  base scenario,  the  adjusting  aggregate  demand  variable  under
the  binding  foreign  saving  constraint  is  budgetary  fixed-capital  investment,  i.e. we have returned  to closure  rule  2.1  of teble  3.3.
" This is  a  combined  result  of the  coefficients  of the  private  consumption
function  (see  line 5  table  2.3),  and the  magnitude  of the fiscal  adjustment:
public consumption  galls by  1.4 percentage  points of GDP by  1995 and DRS
increases  by 2.6 percentage  points of GDP.  However,  current-price  private
consumption  increases  by  more  than  constant-price  consumption,  due  to  the  decline
in the GDP deflator,  in absolute  terms,  relative  to the private  consumption
deflator.53  -
TABLE  5.3
KEY  NACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS  TABLE
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT  SCENARIO
FOREIGN  SAVING  CONSTRAINT
SIMULATION  RESULTS.  1988-1995
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  193  1994  1995
REAL  GROWTH  RATES:
GOP  CHIKGCP  0.066  0.049  0.027  0.030  0.034  0.036  0.037  0.036
Investmnt  CH  KFI  0.053  0.263  *0.091  0.084  0.06S  0.055  0.051  0.052
Exports  CN  KEXP  0.018  0.045  0.028  0.030  0.033  0.035  0.035  0.035
GOP  Per  Capita  CH  KGOPPOP  0.035  0.020  -0.001  0.003  0.007  0.010  0.011  0.011
Cons4uption  per  Capita  Ck_CPPOP  0.017  0.014  -0.004  0.004  0.010  0.018  0.018  0.019
ICOR:  ICOl  1.78  2.35  5.10  4.11  3.79  3.69  3.67  3.79
AGGREGATE  DEKAND  COMPOSITION:
(as share  of  GDP)
Resource  Balance  RESUALGDP  0.03?  0.014  -0.014  .0.011  -0.0O7  -0.010  -0.013  -0.015
Exports  EXPGOP  0.312  0.338  0.362  0.370  0.374  0.374  0.375  0.378
laports  tIMPGDP  0.275  0.324  0.377  0.381  0.381  0.384  0.388  0.393
Total  Consumption  C TOTGOP  0.747  0  750  0.765  0.777  0.785  0.787  0.791  0.798
Private  Consumption  CFGDP  0.517  0.520  0.530  0.542  0.550  0.555  0.562  0.571
Public  Consumption  CGGDP  0.230  0.231  0.235  0.235  0.235  0.232  0.230  0.227
Gross  Fixed  Capital  Investment  FtGOP  0.180  0.226  0.208  0.224  0.233  0.238  0.243  0.248
Private  Invest  FIPGDP  0.090  0.126  0.105  0.116  0.124  0.130  0.136  0.146
PubLic  Invest  FIGGDP  0.089  0.100  0.104  0.108  0.109  0.109  0.106  0.102
Change  In  Stocks  CHSTKGDP  0.036  0.010  0.041  0.011  -0.010  -0.015  -0.021  -0.031
Foreign  Saving  CAGDP  *0.004  0.021  0.049  0.047  0.043  0.044  0.045  0.047
National  Saving  SNATGDP  0.220  0.215  0.199  0.187  0.180  0.179  0.176  0.171
Private  Saving  SPGDP  0.219  0.211  0.196  0.174  0.157  0.144  0.126  0.101
Public  Saving  SGGOP  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.013  0.023  0.0L5  0.050  0.070
Marginal  National  Savirg  MNSR  MA  0.105  -0.718  -0.190  0.008  0.134  0.091  0.013
PUBLIC  DEFICIT:
(as share of  GDP)
Totat  Public  DEF_PUBGOP  0.088  0.097  0.100  0.095  0.086  0.073  0.056  0.032
Budgetary  Gov't  DEFStGDCP  0.059  0.068  0.070  0.071  0.068  0.064  0.056  0.042
Other  Public  DEF_0THMGDP 0.028  0.029  0.030  0.024  0.018  0.010  0.000  *0.010
PRICES  AND  INTEREST  RATES:
Nominal  Avg  Exchange  Rate  EE  1.8D6  2.113  2.470  2.600  2.737  2.881  3.033  3.192
Real  E-rate  Index  ('88s100)  RER  100.000  91.697  74.681  74.598  75.129  74.904  74.563  73.971
!nflation  INFL  0.119  0.127  0.139  0.078  0.087  0.097  0.095  0.092
Rom.  Deposit  Rate  1law1  0.03  0.086  0.088  0.091  0.093  0.096  0.099  0.101
Real  Loan  Rate  (ex-post)  LOANRATE  c i10  0.002  *0.008  0.049  0.040  0.029  0.026  0.021
Nom.  Public  Debt  Interest  Rate  lBS  0.133  0.132  0.132  0.134  0.134  0.132  0.127  0.117
MONEY  AND  DOMESTIC  DEBT:
(as  share  of  GOP)
Monetary  Base  STK  MONGDP  0.077  0.077  0.078  0.080  0.082  0.082  0.082  0.083
ml  STKIM1GCP  0.151  0.151  0.154  0.158  0.160  0.161  0.162  0.163
Quasi money  STK_qNGDP  0.175  0.175  0.179  0.183  0.186  0.186  0.188  0.190
Domestic  Debt  STK_BGDP  0.474  0.469  0.481  0.504  0.510  0.499  0.471  0.424
BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS:
(US S Million)
Resource  Balance  D  RESBAL  218.2  84.6  -83.9  -69.1  *49.1  -71.9  -99.1  -130.2
Not  Foreign  Factor  Income  D  NFY  -198.0  -188.9  -197.5  *214.2  -222.7  -231.7  -240.8  *250.3
Tranfers  D:TRANS  5.0  -18.3  -13.1  -13.8  -14.4  -14.9  *15.4  -16.4
Current  Account  0 CA  25.2  -122.6  -294.5  *297.1  -286.2  -318.4  -355.3  -396.9
Official  Capital  Grants  DOIKGRANT  59.1  53.9  82.0  87.0  92.0  95.5  99.0  102.5
LT  Capital  Inflows  D KINFLOWi  *194.9  104.9  108.2  114.9  120.3  120.8  121.2  121.7
Total  Other  Item  D  OTNER  1U8.6  -43.?  200.1  152.9  130.3  157.4  189.1  225.5
Net  IMF  Credit  D IMFCREDIT  -85.0  *40.0  -23.0  -8.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Change  in Gross Reserve*  C_DFRES  7.0  47.5  -72.8  49.7  -56.4  -55.2  *54.0  -52.8
INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES  AND  DEBT:
Stock of  Gross Reserves (USS  Mn)  OFRES  295.2  244.7  316.0  365.5  421.7  476.6  530.3  582.7
Total  External  Debt  (USS  IM)  OFOEIT TOT  2670.6  2728.0  2812.8  2928.4  3052.0  3175.4  3298.8  3422.2
Net Reserves  (months  imports)  FRESIMP  1.8  1.4  1.7  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.2
Total  External  Debt/GDP  Ratio  DESTGDP  0.487  0.493  0.484  0.478  0.466  0.449  0.433  0.418- 54 -
There  are significant  effects  of fiscal  stabilization  on public  domestic
financing  needs,  public  debt,  and  domestic  interest  rates. The decline  in the
deficit  reduces  strongly  the  need  of  domestic  debt  financing,  allowing  a  massive
decline  in the ratio  of consolidated  domeetic  public  debt to GDP.
In  the short  run,  the  public  deficit  declines  from  9.5Z  of GDP  in 1991  to
8.6S in 1992 --  already  lower  than the  base case deficits  of around  10.5-10.8
percentage  points of GDP.  However,  the debt/CDP ratio still continues to
increase  from  50.4:  in 1991  to 512  of GDP in 1992.
In 1993  however,  the  deficit  falls  to 7.32  and the  debt/GDP  ratio  starts
to  fall  accordingly, to  49.92.  Hence  the  intensifying 1991-93 fiscal
stabilization  is  enough  to  put  Zimbabwe's  debt  on a sustainable  path,'4  avoiding
the gradual  explosion  of debt and interest  rates of the base scenario. The
magnitude  of the  deficit  which  comes  out  as  sustainable  in  these  simulations  --
around  82  of  GDP  --  is  precisely  consistent  with the  calculations  of  sustainable
deficits  for  Zimbabwe  in Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990).
Although  sustainability  of  domestic  debt  paths  is  already  achieved  by the
1993 stabilization,  it is still far from enough for achieving  an acceptable
recovery  of private  sector  spending --  for that  reason  we simulate  a deeper
stabilization  continuing  throughout  1994-95.  This  allows  a  reduction  of  the  1995
ratio  of total  domestic  debt  to  GDP from  60.5Z  under  the  base scenario  to 42.42
as a result  of fiscal  stabilization  --  a  massive  debt  reduction  which allows
1995 interest  rates  on public  debt to decline  from 14.92  in the base case to
11.72 in the fiscal adjustment  scenario.  Figure 5.3 reports the 1988-95
trajectories  of domestic  public  debt/GDP  ratios  and the  corresponding  interest
rates  under  both scenarios.
The final  effect  of fiscal  stabilization  on public  deficits  exceeds  the
"  Sustainability  is defined according to the steady-state  concept of
maintaining  constant  the  ratio  between  a  given  liability  to  GDP (domestic  public
debt in this case), for given trajectories  of other liabilities  (constant
monetary  base and declining  external  debt to GDP ratios  for 1991-95,  in our
case).- 55 -
initial  budgetary  expenditure-cutting  and public  enterprise  revenue-enhancing
measures,  as the  decline  in domestic  public  debt stocks  and its  interest  rates
constitutes  an  additional  boost  to  public  sector  saving. Hence  the  total  effect
on the  consolidated  public  deficit  is  to reduce  it  by 1995  from  11.62  of  GDP in
the base case to 3.22 in the fiscal adjustment scenario.  The budgetary
government  contributes.  4.1  percentage  points  of  GDP  and  the  other  public  sector
adds 4.3  percentage  points  to this  decline. In 1991,  the  budgetary  goverrnment
ends  up with a  more  modest  4.22  deficit,  while the  other  public  sector  is able
to generate  a  surplus  of 1.01  of GDP.
One final  word  on investment  and  growth  is in  order. Our  simulations  show
a slight  decline  in  GDP growth  over the  1991-95  projection  horizon,  reflecting
the contractionary  effects  of lower  public  consumption. However,  lower  real
interest  rates  spur  private  fixed-capital  investment,  raising  the  share  of  total
gross  fixed  capital  investment  in  1995  from  23.32  of  GDP  in  the  base  scenario  to
24.82  under fiscal  adjustment. This has positive  implications  for long-term
growth prospects beyond 1995, not reflected  by our medium-term simulation
horizon.Figure 5.3
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper  has developed  and applied  a  macroeconomic  general  equilibrium
model for Zimbabwe.  Its use illustrates  the strength  and versatility  of a
general  equilibrium  framework  which relies  on the interaction  of an estimated
behavioral  structure  and  budget  constraints  (or  flow-of-funds  equations)  for  a
sensible  sector  disaggregation.
Three  scenarios  were simulated  with our  model. The  first  or  base  scenario
assumes  an increasing  relaxation  of the foreign  resource  constraint  and  a mild
and  transitory  oil  shock,  while  domestic  policies  and  structural  features  of the
Zimbabwean  economy  remain  unaltered. The implications  for  both stabilization
objectives  and  growth  prospects  of  this  "business  as  usual"  scenario  are  serious.
Fiscal  deficits  are unaustainably  high, implying  increasing  domestic  debt and
interest  rates  and  depressed  private  expenditure  levels. Even  more serious,  low
fixed  investment levels are  the main  cause  of  modest  growth.  Fiscal
stabilization  and  structural  reforms  removing  distortions  in  trade  and  financial
markets are required to ensure macroeconomic  stability and higher capital
formation,  which are prerequisites  for achieving  higher future  growth  and a
decline  in unemployment.
The  second scenario assumes a  more  intense and extended oil  shock
throughout  1991-92.  Its effects  on the oil-dependent  Zimbabwean  economy  are
significant:  growth  declines,  inflation  rises,  the  real  exchange  depreciates  (by
an  amount depending on  the  availability  of  foreign finance required to
accommodate  part  of the  oil  shock),  and  private  investment  suffers.
The  third  scenario  simulates  a  gradual  but  deep  fiscal  reform,  relying  on
a combination  of budgetary  current expenditure  cuts and an increase  in the
operating  surplus  of  public  enterprises.  Reducing  the  consolidated  public  sector
deficit  over  1991-95  has  major  benefits  for  macroeconomic  stability  and  long-term
growth  prospects  in  Zimbabwe. The  domestic  debt  to  GDP  ratio  starts  to  decline,
allowing  domestic  real interest  rates to fall,  which reinforces  the initial- 58  -
fiscal  adjustment  and  spurs  private  investment.  Although  the  fiscal  adjustment
is  slightly  contractionary  in  the  short-run,  long-term  GDP  growth  benefits  from
higher  private  capital  formation.
Future  work  on  macroeconomic  adjustment  in  Zimbabwe  should  address  the
effects  of  trade  reform  and  other  structural  changes,  which  are  major  policy
imperatives  for  achieving  higher  growth  rates.  This  would  require  amendments  and
extensions  of the  macroeconomic  model  structure,  discussed  in  more  detail  in
Appendix  5.- 59 -
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APENIX1:  ADDITIONAL  EQUATIONS
This  appendix  spells  out  further  equations  of the  model  discussed  but  not
presented  in Section  2.
A.  BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
Interest  Payments
The equations for interest payments on domestic-currency  assets and
liabilities  are the  following:
(3.  1)  Nob  =  ioSLbo.  -1
(A3. 2)  Nbcb  icbb  SLcbb,  -I
(A3.3)  Nbbv  =  ib8b  SLbab,.
(A3.4)  Nbp  =  pb  SLpb,  -
(A3.  5)  No=b  ib,o  SLcho  -1
(A3.6)  Nob  ibsa  SLbo.  -1.
(A3.7)  N0 p  2  ipo  SLpo,
A3.  8 )  Nbjeb  =  iCbbgr SLcbbe,.  -
(A3.9)  Npb  -cbp  SLcbp. -1
(A3.10)  NRes  =  iRes  SRes- 1
(A3.  11)  NNOLcb  =  1iLcb  SNOLcb, -1
(A3.12)  Npbe  =  'bsp  SLbsp,  -1
(A3.  13)  NOM  =  i OSQM..
(A3.  14)  NNOLbv  =  limb.  SNOLbg.-
The  equations  for  interest  puyments  in  domestic  currency  units  of foreign-
currency  assets  and liabilities  are the  following:- 61 -
(A3.15)  Nbf  =  ifb  E!1 SLfb.-
(A3.16)  Nof=  ifo  E!j  SLfO,-
(A3.17)  NFAcb  =  iFAcb  Ell  SFACb,1
(A3.18)  NFLCb  = 
1F,cb  Ell  SFLcb,
(A3.19)  NIMF  =  iv  E-  SIM-',
(A3.20)  NFAb,,  =  FAb  Ell  SFA-o,-.
(A3.21)  NFLbs  =  iFLbS  E  1  SFLb,,-l
(A3.22)  Nfp  =  i  p  E!'  SLfp. 1
(A3.23)  NSpf  =  izf  EJ' 1 SLSf;p...
(A3.24)  NKnei  =  i,me  E!j  SKnei-
Asset  Accumulation  Equations
End-of-period  domestic-currency  assets  and  l'abilities  increase  over  time
by the following  simple  accumulation  equations:
(B1.  1)  Lb=  SLbo  - SLbo._
(Bl.2)  Lbsb  =  SLbsb  - SLbsb,l
(B1.  3)  LbUo  =  SLbso  - SLbso,  -I
(B1.  4)  Lbsp  =  SLbsp  - SLb,p.  -1
(B1.  5)  Lc=b  SLcbb  - SLbb,  -I
(B1.6)  Lchb-  SLcbb  SLcbs.-
(B1.  7)  Lebo  =  SLcbo  - SLcbo,  -1
(B1.  8)  LCbp  =  SLcbp  -SL- 62 -
(Bl.9)  Lpb  SLpb  -SLpb*-l
(Bl.10)  L,o  SLPO  -SLpo,-l
(Bl.11)  NOLbM - SNOLbI  - SNOLba..l
(Bl.12)  NOLab  =  SNOLCb  - SNOLCb,-I
(B1.13)  Res  *  SRes  - SRES-
(51.14)  Cu  SCu - SCU.
(B1.15)  Ml  - SMi - SM-l
(B1.16)  QM  *  SQM - SOQM
End-of-period  domestic  currency  values of foreign-currency  denominated
assets  and  liabilities  increase  by the  following  equations:
(Bl.17)  SLfb  s  SLtb,  *  + Lt  + Rfb
(Bl.18)  SLtO  SLfO.. 1 + Lfo  + RLto
(Bl.19)  SFLQJ  *  SFLeb,  -l  + FL 0 b +  RFLdb
(Bl.20)  SFLb.  =  SFLb,  1  + FLbs +  RFLbS
(Bl.21)  SLfp  =  SLfp,  - +  Lfp  + RLfp
(B1.22)  SLSfp  =  SLSp  - 1 + LSfp + RLStp
(Bl.23)  SKnei  =  SKnei-L + Knei  + RKnei
(B1.24)  SIMF  =  SIMF..1 + IMF + RIMF
(B1.25)  SFAc  - SFAcb,  1 + FAcb  +  RFAcb
(B1.26)  SFAb,  p  SFAh,-,  +  FAbI  + RFAb,- 63  -
where  the  capital  gains  (or  losses)  due  to  exchange rate  devaluations  are  defined
ant
(B1.27)  RL,b  E  (SL;b  - SL;b, 1)  E  I  +  (E- 1 SL;b,) t-]
EO
(B1.  28)  RL, 0 =  E (SLro  - SLro  )  ..  EC  ]  E! 1 Sfwl 
(B1.  29)  RFLcb  =E  (SFLCqb  - SFLCb, -1)  [  E  + (E.!, SFLcb,  -1)  E-',
(B1.20)  RFLb  =  E(SFL;b  - SFLb.  -l)  E  -E-  +  (E-E
(-  (E! SFL;Cb. 1)  l
(B1.  31)  RL,p  =  E(SL,p  - SLfp,  1 )  I E3E  +  (E, SL;p,  SL) I  [ fp  ~~~~E  E-±!, 1
(B. 32)  RLS  =  E(SLS,p  - SLSp,.)  EE]  +  E! 1 SLS;p,_l)  I  -
tp  ~~~~~E  E!
(Bl.33)  RKnei  E(SKnei  - SKnei*j.)  [E  E]  +  (E!  SKnei.)  [EE
E
(Bl.  34)  RIMF  =  E (SIMF  - SIMFz1)  [ 3EE  +  (E,.  SIMF*)  [ E  ],
E  E6
(B1.  35)  RFACb  =  E (SFACb  - SFAbE  )  [EE]  +  (E!1  SFAcb,l)  [E-1
(B1.  36)  RFAbs  =  E(SFAb,  - SFA;s. -1 ) 1EE  I  +  (E!1  SFA; 9 ,p, 1)  E-]- 64  -
B.  MARKET  EQUILIBRIUW  CONDITIONS  AND BEHAVIORAL  STRUCTURE
Assets  Markets  Behavioral  Structural
Interest  rates i.,  iW and ib.p  constitute  the anchors  for all remaining
interest  rates,  linked  to any  one  of the  former  by their  actual  1988  relation:
(B3.3)  icbb  (Ucbb,81/A,,88)i  =  (0.1286/0.1330)iB
(B3.4)  'bob  =  ("bob,e8/
1 88B)'  =  (0.1286/0.1330)iB
(B3.5)  ipb  =  (jpb,9/ 11,88)is  ,  '  (0.1286/0.1330)1B
(B3.6)  ibo  (bo988/1B,88)  'B  =  (0.1003/0.1330)iB
(B3.7)  '  CbO  (=CbO,881  B,88)  'D  =  (0.1286/0.  1330)iB
(B3.8)  'boo  =  (ibsO,88/
1 B,8)  iB  =  (0.1286/0.1330)ig
(B3.9)  ipo =  (ipoj,88iB,88)iB  =  (0.1286/0.1330)1B
(B3.10)  icbp  (icbp9sSIbgp,88ibbp  =  (0.13/0.13)ibsp
(B3.11)  'wLcb  =  vLcb  8/,Q.im  )dia  =  (0.1000/0.0825)1O
(B3.12)  iWLbs  =  NOLbs,88/imedio  =  (0.1000/0.0825)io
Aggregate  Demand  Components
Further  equations  for  aggregates  of aggregate  demand  components  are the
following:
(B5.  18)  cb  =  domcb + 1 MPCb
(B5.19)  C  Cb  +  Cp
(BS.20)  fib  =  domfib  +  lmpfib
(B5.21)  fio  =  domfi0 + impEio
(BS.22)  ff  =  fb  + fio + fip
(B5.23)  impC  =  1mpRb  +  Impop- 65  -
(B5.24)  impfi  =  impfib  +  impfEl  +  impfip
(B5.25)  imp  =  impc  + impfi  + mint
(B5.26)  domc  c  C  - impc
(B5.27)  domfil  =  fi  - impfi
Goods  Prices
Law-of-one-price  equations  are introduced  for the following  export and
import  prices:
(B6.2)  Pexp  - E  PAxp
(B6.3)  Pzcp=  E  Pp  (1  +  ta.rp)
(BS.  4)  Pzp'cb  E  PLwb  (1  +  taxm,,b)
(6.  5)  P  ip  =  E  P;, 1 p  (1  +  tazw 1 p)
(B6.  6)  PZIpib  =  EPZmb  (1  + tarwpii)
(B6.7)  ZrfpIe  =  E  P;pi, (1 +  tazwi 0 )
(6.  8)  P,Inlt  =  E P;Int  (1  +  tamifnt)
Domestic  goods  prices  are  determined  by the  following  projection  rules:
(B6. 9)  PDomcb  P  Domcb,-1  (1  +  grPoDmcb)
(B6.  10)  PDomip  =  oomip,  (1  +  *rpD><p)
(B6. 11)  PDomib  =  PDOb,-1  (1  + gZrPD1b)
(6.  12)  PDX  =Q  PDo=bo-l  (1 + grpDi.)
(B6 13)  pchet  Pchoti-I  ( 1 +  g-rPc,,cd- 66 -
Prices  of aggregates  are  defined  by the  following  adding-up  constraintss
(B6.  14)  PC  PdwPdomcp  + P,itmPc
CP
SB6 . 15)  P  b  =  Pd,.bdoMcb  +  Pz,,CbimpCb
Cb
(B6.16)  pip  =  PDopdomp  +  prmpik imp1 p
fip
(B6.  17)  Pib  =  PDibdomib  +  PIIpibimpib
(B6.18)  p10 =  PDomidomio  PrmpioimPic
(B6.  19)  Ir  Prvcpimpc  + P1 tjpimpj,  +  Pi,igimpig  +  Pvifcmint pnw  ~~~~~imp
Auxiliary  Linkages
The  following  equations  link  assets  and  income  flows  defined  by the  budget
constraints  with equivalent  variables  of the  behavioral  model  block. The first
three  of  the  following  equations  splice  monetary  base,  total  domestic  public  debt
and  private  disposable  income  to  certain  1988  values  which  differ  from  the  values
given  by the  corresponding  definitions  consistent  with the  budget  constraints.
The  reason  for  these  differences  is  that  the  time-series  measures  of these  three
variables used in the econometric  estimations  differ from the  1988 budget
constraint  measures.
Base money  (H) and consolidated  financial/non-financial  public sector
domestic  debt (B) of the asset  market equilibrium  conditions  are defined  as
functions of equivalent budget-constraint  variables, using 1988 values as
"pivots":
(B7.1)  H  *  [H8 1l(SRes88 + SCUB8) I  (SRes  + SCU)- 67  -
(B7.2)  B  =  [Bs9I(SLMpb, 89 + SLpO,89 + SNOLcb, 89 + SLbsb,sa
+  SLbso, 8 8  - SLCbp.88  - SL¢ 5 bs. 8 8) ]  (SLpb  + SLpo
SNOLcb  +  SLbb  +  SLbUO  - SLCbp  - SLcbb,)
Disposable  private  income  (DYp) is  defined  as  a  function  of  private  income
from  the  private  sector  current  account  equation:
(B7.3)  DYp  =  DYp, 88/(Yfp,eS  + Tbp,sa  *  TOP,s8  + T  4p,88  + COGP,8 8
+ Residb,,88  +  Nbp  88  +  N0P 88 +  NNOLcb-88  +  NQM88
+  NNOLbSs 8 - Td 8 8 - OthR 8 9 - PR9 8 - Npcb  Npbs  Nf,88
NSpf  88  - Nknei 8 8 )]  (Yfp  +  Tbp  +  Top  + Tfp  +OGp
+ ResidbS  +  Nbp  +  Nop  +  NNOLCb  +  NQM  +  IVNOLbs  - Td  - OthR
PR  - Npcb  - Npbg  - N  - NSpf  - Nknei)
Private  sector  factor  income  is  defined  as  follows:
(B7.4)  Yfp  - Py  - Yfb  - DRS  - Ti  +  Subb + SubO- 68  -
APPENDIX  2: SECTOR  BUDGET  CONSTRAINT  AND  BALANCE  SHEET  DATA  CALIBRATION  FOR 1988
BASE YEAR
One of the important features  of the  RMSM-XX  Zimbabwe  model  is  the
incorporation  of a flow-of-funds  consistency  framework  similar  to that  used in
the  RMSM-X  model.  These  budget  constraints  require  that  each sector's  uses of
funds  equal  sources  of  funds. Because  this  condition  is  rarely  fulfilled  by the
raw  data and  because  data from  different  sources  conflicts  (for  example,  trade
data from  the  balance  of payments  differs  from  that  of  national  accounts)  or is
simply  unavailable  (for  instance,  private  sector  data is  rarely  published)  the
modeler  must first  construct  a  consistent  flow-of-funds  framework.  This  process
entails  many  judgements  such  as  which  sources  of  data  take  precedence  over  others
and  which  variables  will  be  designated  as  residuals.  This  appendix  discusses  the
process  used to construct  the 1988 base year consistency  framework  for the
Zimbabwe  model. It is  assumed  that  the  reader  is  already  familiar  with flow-of-
funds consistency frameworks.  For  more  information on  the  theory and
construction  of  the  consistency  framework,  see  the  RMSM-X  User's  Notebook,  World
Bank (1991).
RESIDUALS
Before  discussing  the  actual  mechanics  of constructing  the framework,  it
is important  to clarify  the  crucial  term  residual  used throughout  the  following
discussion.  It  refers  to  several  different  concepts  which  can  be  separated  into
two  broad  categories.  The  first  occurs  when  there  are  multiple  data  sources  (for
instance, government  consumption  data from the national accounts and  the
government  fiscal accounts)  which provide conflicting  figures for the same
accounting  concept.  This is  what is called  overidentification  of sources,  a
situation  that  necessitates  some  form  of reconciliation.  The  most  common  way to
do this is first to prioritize  the sources  and then designate  an adjusting
(residual)  sub-variable  to reconcile  the  two  sources. For  instance,  if export
and  import  data from the balance  of payments  is prioritized  over the values- 69  -
coming  from  the  national  accounts,  then  either  another  aggregate  demand  component
or  GDP  has  to  be  chosen  as  the  residual  such  that  the  national  accounts'  income-
expenditure  identity  is  satisfied.  As  described  below,  the  residual  selected  is
private  consumption  expenditure.
The  second  form  of  residual  occurs  in  the  opposite  situation  when there  is
insufficient  information  for  a  particular  concept  --  in  other  words,  the  variable
in question  is  underidentified.  It is comon  practice  in this  case to rely  on
residual  variables  to  fill  in  the  missing  pieces  of information. However,  this
process  is not entirely  ad-hoc  since  adding-up  constraints  such  as the budget
constraints  allow  missing  variables  to  be  identified  endogenously.  For  instance,
in this  model  the  net surplus  of the  banking  system  (profits)  was chosen  as a
residual such that the entire banking system budget constraint  was  still
satisfied  --  i.e.  sources  equal  uses. A similar  process  is the  alteration  of a
stock  variable  such  that  the  resulting  flow,  defined  as  the  change  in stocks,  is
consis-ent  with  the  budget  constraints.  Aside  from  budget  constraints  and  stock-
flow  identities,  there  are  other  adding-up  relationships  as  well.  For  instance,
if  information  for  total  investment  and  public  investment  were  available,  private
investment  could  be readily  calculated  as a residual.
Table  A2.2 identifies  the  closure  variables  for  the  set  of sector  budget
constraints  and  income/expenditure  identity  (underlined  variables)  for 1988.
DATA  SOURCES
The  six  sector  RMSM-XX  consistency  framework  constructed  for  Zimbabwe  drew
on many data sources.  In general,  monetary  system  data,  which includes  the
central bank and banking system, came from the  "International  Financial
Statistics"  of the  IMF.  Budgetary  and  other  public  sector  data  was taken  from
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)  which  ultimately  drew  on fiscal  data from  the  Government
of Zimbabwe  Ministry  of Finance:  "Financial  Statements"  (various  issues)  and
estimates  of other  public  sector  data  from  Walton  (1988). Additional  data  came
from  the  national  accounts,  the  balance  of  payments  as published  in  the  various- 70  -
bank sources,  and the  World Bank  Debt Tables (World  Bank, 1990).  Table  A2.1
lists  the main information  source  for sector  accounts.  Following is a more
detailed  description  of the  sources  and/or  construction  of individual  items  as
well as the  closure  of each  sector's  account.
1.  HONETARY  SECTOR
The monetary  sector  consi.s of the central  bank (cb) and the private
banking  system (bs).  In both cases  the a priori  assumption  was that saving
determined  below the line  equals  zero since  any above-the-line  surpluses  are
transferred  to  the  government  sector  in  the  case  of the  central  bank,  and  to  the
private  sector  in the  case  of the  banking  system.
Starting  with  the  cb  capital  account,  flows  were  constructed  from  IFS  stock
data.  Table  A2.3 presents  the  complete  1987  and 1988  balance  sheets  for  each
sector. Revaluation  effects  due to  exchange  rate  changes  are  counted  as flows
to  or from  tne  external  sector. For  the  central  bank  sector  these  include  RPLCb,
RIMF,  and  RFACb.  Similarly,  the  banking  system  included  RFLb.  and  RFAb..
The adjusting  (residual)  variable  was NOLCb. Since the 1987 SNOLeb  was
already  given, and NOL adjusted  to maintain  a zero Scb,  SNOIcb for 1988 was
determined.  The  banking  system  capital  account  was constructed  in  a  similar  way
from  IFS stock  data  with  NOLb.  selected  as the  adjusting  variable.
Next,  moving  above  the  line  to the  current  account,  most of the  variables
are  interest  flows. If the  flows  of interest  payments  were available,  we used
the  data  directly. Furthermore,  by  dividing  the  previous  period's  stock  of  debt
by the interest  payment,  the  implicit  interest  rate  was calculated. Interest
rates  calculated  this  way  include  icbbl  icbot  ib,b9  and  ib.o.
However,  in  some  cases  information  about  interest  flows  was  not  available,
which  necessitated  a  reversal  of  the  process  described  above.  Interest  payments
were obtained  in this case by multiplying  exogenous interest  rates and the
previous  period's  stocks  of debt.  For instance,  the total  domestic  interest
payments  for  the  budgetary  government  were  available  from  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)- 71  -
which allowed  us to calculate  an average  interest  rate for all loans to the
government.  Assuming  that this  interest  rate  was applicable  to all loans  from
the  bs,  cb,  and  p sectors  to  the  government,  the  interest  flows  to  these  sectors
were then  easily  calculated. The  interest  flows,  N, that  were  constructed  from
interest  rates  applied  to  stocks  of  debt  include  Nbb, NHjp,  NpCb,  Nbb.9  Nob.  Npb.,  NQM
and  NIMF.
In the extreme  case  where interest  payments  or interest  rates  were not
available,  we had to make assumptions  about the interest  rate in order to
construct  interest  flows. For  example,  because  flows  of interest  payments  from
bs  to  cb  were not  known,  we were  forced  to  assume  a  constant  91 interest  rate  on
loans  from  the  cb to  bs which  was  used to calculate  interest  payments  from  the
bs to the cb.  Many foreign  interest  payments  were also calculated  this  way
including,  NFACb,  NFL,b,  NNOLeb,  NFAt,,  NFLb., NNOLb..  Table  A2.4  summarizes  the
1988 interest  rates on all interest-bearing  assets, consistent  with sector
portfolios  presented  in  table  A2.3.
This exhausts  all the flow  variables  in the cb and bs current  accounts
except  for  the  residual  variables,  ResidCb  and  Residb.,  which  adjust  to  maintain
saving  in  both sectors  equal  to zero. This  closed  the  central  bank  and  banking
system  accounts.
2.  BUDGETARY  GOVERNMENT
Unlike  the  monetary  sector  where  cb  and  be saving  were  determined  below  the
line,  saving  for  the  budgetary  government  (b)  accounts  was  established  above  the
line  in  the  current  account. With  the  exception  of  public  consumption  (C.),  all
government  revenues  and current  expenditures  were taken from Schmidt-Hebbel
(1990),  table  1 (averages  oz fiscal  year  data). However,  C.  was taken  from  the
national  accounts. Because  the  transfers  from  the  central  bank (Resideb)  enters
the  model  explicitly,  other  revenue  (OthR)  as  presented  in  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990),
table  1,  was reduced  accordingly. Interest  payments  Nbcb  and Nbb. were alreedy
determined  in the  monetary  sector. Nbp  was calculated  using the same interest- 72  -
rate  as that  applied  to bs and  cb loans  to the  government. Similarly,  foreign
interest  payments (Nbf)  were calculated  from the implicit interest  rate on
foreign  loans  to the  government. Finally,  Nob  was taken  directly  from  Schmidt-
Hebbel (1990),  table 3.  The remaining  item, budgetary saving (Sb)  is the
adjusting  variable  for  the  current  account.
Below  the  line in the  budgetary  government's  current  account,  two items,
LCbb  and  Lbp,  had  already  been  determined  by the  monetary  accounts. KOGb,  Lfb,  and
FIb  were taken  from Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990),  table  1, and Lb.  came from Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1990),  table  2.  Since  saving  was  already  determined  above  the  line,  the
remaining  residual  variable  is  Lbp-
3.  OTHER  PUBLIC  SECTOR
Other  public  sector  saving  was determined  above  the line in the  current
account  as calculated  from  other  sector  data  in  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990),  table  3.
.his  is  also  the  source  of  the  two  non-interest  items:  depreciat-on  and  retained
surplus  (DRS)  and transfers  from  the  budget  (TbO).  COG.  and C.  were assumed  to
be zero. Total  interest  flows  also  came  from  this  source  but  their  distribution
among  domestic  and  foreign  interest  payments  was  modified. Interest  flows  which
were already  defined  by the closure  of the  monetary  and budgetary  government
accounts  include  Nob,  Noeb, Nob., and Tb 0. N.P  was calculated  using the same
interest  rate  as  N,b  and  Nob.  and  the  1987  stock  of loans  from  the  private  sector
to the  other  public  sector.  The  final  residual  item  left  to close  the  current
account  was therefore  foreign  interest  payments  (Nof).
Moving  to  the  capital  account,  LbO,  LCbOl and  Lb. 0 were already  determined  by
the other  three  capital  accounts  (b,  cb, and  bs).  FIO  was calculated  as the
total  FI from  the  national  accounts  less  private  FI and  budgetary  government  FI
and Lf.  came from Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)  table 3.  KOGO from the balance of
payments  was zero,  leaving  Lpo  as the  residual.- 73  -
4.  EXTERNAL  SECTOr.
A large  portion  of  this  sector  is  already  determined.  Above  the  line  items
already  determined  include  COGb, COG., NFACb,  NEAb,I Nbf,  Noft NFL,1b  NIMD?,  and  NFLIb.
Imports,  exports,  Tfp,  COGP, and  NKnei  were  taken  from  the  balance  of  payments.
N.,  and  NSpf was  calculated  assuming  an  exogenous  interest  rate  on  foreign  loans
to  the  private  sector.  Net  profit  remittances  (PR)  was calculated  from  balance
of  payments  data  as  follows:  profit  payments  abroad  were  calculated  as  the  total
factor  payments  from  the  balance  of  payments  less  the  sum  of  all  interest
payments  abroad.  Profit  receipts  were  calculated  as  the  difference  between  total
factor  receipts  and  all  foreign  interest  receipts.  Hence,  net  PR was  determined
as  profit  payments  minus  profit  receipts.  This  covers  all  the  items  in  the
external  sector  current  account,  and  consequently,  foreign  saving  (St)  remains
as  the  residual.
Most  of  the  entries  in  the  external  sector  capital  account  have  already
been  established.  Thaue  include  FACb,  RFAC,, FAb., RFAb,, KOGb, Lfb,  KOG 0,  Lfo,  FLcb,
RFLCb, IMF,  RIME, FLb.,  and  RFLb..  KOGp,  DFI,  and  Knei  were  taken  from  the  balance
of  payments.  LSfp was  calculated  as  the  change  in  SLSfp which  came  from  the  World
Bank  Debt  Tables,  (World  Bank,  1990).  In  a  similar  manner,  the  flows  of  external
debt  to  the  private  sector  was  determined  from  changes  in  the  SLfp.  Because  SLfp
was  not  available,  it  was  constructed  as  a  residual  of  the  data  from  the  World
Bank  Debt  Tables.  The  remaining  residual  variable  used  to  close  the  external
sector  capital  account  is  Errors  and  Omissions,  EO.
5.  PRIVATE SECTOR
In  the  private  sector  current  account,  factor  income  (Yfp)  and  private
investment  (Ip)  came  from  the  national  accounts.  The  residual  item,  private
consumption  (Cp)  comes  from  the  income-expenditure  identity  of  the  national
accounts.  All  other  current  account  flows  are  already  determined  above  by  other
sectors.- 74 -
In the capital  account,  foreign  debt stocks  of the  private sector  were
obtained  using  information  provided  by the  World  Bank  Debt  Tables,  (World  Bank,
1990a). The breakdown  of total  foreign  debt  by the latter  source  was used to
determine  short-term  private  debt (SLSfp)  and capital  not elsewhere  included
(Sknei).  Total private foreign debt was  obtained  by adding the residual
resulting from total public and public guaranteed  MLT debt minus budgetary
(SLfp),  other public sector (SLf.),  central  bank (SFLCb),  and commercial  bank
(SFLb.),  to  the  private  non-guaranteed  debt. All  other  capital  account  flows  are
already  determined  in the  other  sectors.- 75  -
Table  A2
Primary  Information  Sources  for  Sector  Accounts
Monetary  System
Stocks:  From  IFS
Interest  Payments:  Consistent  with other  sector  flows
and  interest  rates
Budgetarv  Government
Current  Account:  Most from  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)
Public
Consumption:  National  Accounts
Interest  Payments:  Consistent  with other  sector  flows
and intereot  rates
Capital  Account:  Most (including  budgetary
investment)  from  Schmidt-Hebbel
(1990)
Other  Public  Sector
Current  Account:  Most from  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)
Capital  Account:  Most from  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)
Other  public
sector  investment:  Total  public  sector  investment
(from  national  accounts)  less




Current  Account:  Factor  income  and  private
investment  from  National  Accounts
Capital  Account:  Private  foreign  debt calculated  as
a residual  from  World Bank (1990a)
debt figures
Balance  of Payments
Capital  Accounts  Most from  World  Bank (1990b)
Interest  Paymentas  Consistent  with other  sector
flows,  interest  rates,  and  foreign
debt stocks  in  World  Bank (1990a)
Current  Account:  Most from  World.Bank  (1990a)  and
World  Bank (1990b)- 77 -
Table  A2.2
Sector  Budget  Constraints  and  Income/Expenditure  Identitv:
Identification  of Closure  Variables  for 1988  Base  Year
(Z$  million)
CUUaIT  Budgetary  Other  Public  Central  Banking  Private  xtemrnol  National  Total
ACCOUIT  Govt  Sector  Bank  System  Sector  Sector  Accounts  Sources
8uldgetory  Nob  120.3  Resideb  39.4  Td  1,795.9  COGb  0  Yfb  0  3,908.9
______________  ,_____________  ______________  ________________  -Subb  0
Other  PubiLc  Tbo  469.8  COGo  0  OIlS  -23.1  446.7
Sector
Central  Nbcb  39.3  Noeb  23.6  Nbeeb  .4.5  Npeb  0  NFAcb  16.4  77.0
Bank  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Bankin  Nbbe  0.0  Nobs  84.8  NR.S  0  Npbe  200.3  NFAbe  1.7  336.8
Private  Tbp  470.9  Top  0  NNOLcb  -4.9  NQ*  133.7  Tfp  9.0  Yfp  9,690.3  10,897.0
Sector  Nbp  365.6  Nop  32.5  NNOLBS  36.4  COGp  0
Residbs  164.1
External  Nbf  192.3  Nof  40.8  NFLcb  4.3  NFLba  7.1  Npf  37.1  .Exp  .3,325.6  -16.6
Sector  NIMh  18.1  Nepf  44.2  Itp  2.931.S
PRtno  33.6
National  Cb  2,449.8  Co  0  Scb  0  Sba  0  Cp  5  500.5  Sf  -45.7  10,247.9
Accounts  Sb  -128.9  So  144.7  Sp  2,327.5
Total  3,909.0  446.7  76.9  336.8  10,897.6  -16.6  10,247.9
lace
CAPITAL  Budgetary  Other  PubiLc  Central  Banking  Private  External  Patianal  Total
ACCOUNT  Gov't  Sector  Bank  Spetem  Sector  Sector  Accounts  Sources
Budgetary  Lcbb  -32.1  Lbcb  184.2  LDb  391.0  ItOGb  106.7  Sb  -128.9  662.1
Government  Lfb  139.2
Other  Public  Lbo  158.1  Lcbo  -31.0  Lbso  62.1  Loo  112.4  ROGo  0  So  144.7  446.3
Sector  _  Lfo  0
Central  Bank  Re  73.9  NOLcb  -113.3  Plob  -14.6  Scb  0  .52.3
Cu  114.0  RPLcb  9.2
IMF  153.4
RIMP  31.9  ________
Banking  Lcbbs  -49.0  qN  240.2  FLbe  2.0  Sbs  0  773.4
Syate.  Ml  378.1  PFLbs  17.3
NOLbs  184.8
private  Lcbp  0  Lbsp  327.8  KOOp  0  Sp  2,327.5  2,342.5





External  fAob  -16.4  FAbc  3.8  St  -45.7  25.5
Sector  RPAcb  76.2  RFAbe  7.6  _
National  lb  504.0  to  446.3  Ip  962.0  2,297.6 Accounts  Chctk  385.3  _
Totol  662.1  446.3  -52.3  773.4  2,542.5  25.5  2,297.6
Ue*e  _- 78  -
Table  A2.3
Balance  Sheets
(End-of-Period  Z$ million)
CENTRAL BAN
1987  1988  1987  1988
SFPAb  459.3  519.1  SRes  238.7  312.6
SLCbb  306.9  274.8  SCu  389.3  503.3
SLCb.  183.5  152.5  SNOLCb  *49.4  -162.7
SLObb.  -50.0  -99.0  SFL,b  61.7  56.3
SLcbp  0  0  SIMF  259.4  137.9
COMMERCIAL  BANKING  SECTOR
1987  1988  1987  1988
SFAJ,  43.4  54.8  SN1-SCu  835.3  1099.4
sLbsb  388.7  572.9  SQM  1619.6  1859.8
sLb..  659.3  721.4  SLcbb.  -50.0  -99.0
SLb,  540.9  1868.7  SNOLI.  364.2  569.0
SRes  238.7  312.6  SFLb.  101.9  121.2
BUDGETARY  GOVERNMENT
1987  1988  1987  1988
Pitb  SKb
SLb  b  1199.7  1357.8  SLpb  2842.7  3235.7
SLCbb  306.9  274.8
SLb,b  388.7  572.9
SLpb  2669.9  3268.7
OTHER  PUBLIC  SECTOR
1987  1988  -1987  1988
SLw  1199.7  1357.8
SLCbo  183.5  152.5
SLb.o  659.3  721.4
SL O  252.6  365.0
SL7o  566.7  662.0- 79  -
Table  A2.3
(Continued)
NON-FINANCIAL  PRIVATE  SECTOR
1987  1988  1987  1988
Pkp SKp
SLpb  2842.7  3235.7  SL  bP0  0
SL  252.6  365.0  SLb,  1540.9  1868.7
SR5  1224.6  1602.7  SLp  644.5  344.9
SQM  1619.6  1859.8  SLS  442.4  598.4
SNOLCb  -49.4  -162.7  SDFI
SNOLb,  364.2  549.0  SKnei  0  0
EXTERNAL  SECTOR
1987  1988  1987  1988
SLfb  2669.9  3268.7  SFACb  459.3  519.1
SL  566.7  662.0  SFA-.  43.4  54.8
SFtCb  61.7  56.3
SFLb.  101.9  121.2
SLf  742.6  344.9
SJp  442.4  598.4
SKRi  i  0  0
SIMF  259.4  137.9- 80  -
Table  A2.4
1988  Interest  Rates
Budgetary  Government  Other  Public  Sector
ib.  0.1003  iebb  0.1286  ib.  0.1003
ibeb  0.1286  i.  0.1286
$pb  0.1286  ibso  0.1286
ift  0.0720  ip  0.1286
if:1  0.072
Central  Bank  Commercial  Banking  Sector
iobb  0.1286 |iR..  0.0000  °ibb  0.1286  icbbu  0.0900
icbo  0.1286  |  iLcb  0.1000  ibso  0.1286  it  0.1000
1.bb.  0.0900 
1n
. Lb  0.0700  ibsp  0.1300  iUOLb.  0.1000
icbp  0.1300  iu  0.0700  ilt,  0.0000  inA.  0.0700
1 PAb  0.0400  i
.?A.  0.0400
External  Sector  Private  Sector
ifb  0.0720 
1 F
. cb  0.0400  ipb  0.1286  icbp  0.1300
if.  0.0720 
1 FAb.  0.0400  i  0.1286  cbsp  0.1300
irLcb  0.0700  >  0.1000  ifp  0.0500
iFLbs  0.0700  ilOLeb  0.1000  iLSfp  0.1000
ifp  0.0500 
.NOLbt.  0.1000  iifl*,  0.1000
itLS  P  0.1000
iX 8,  0.0100
in 1 0.0700
Note:  Most interest  rates  are linked  to i,  except  two (iNoLcb  and iNoLbS),
which are  linked  to i..  Both i,,  aM 3 i.,  are  determined
endcgenously  by the  asset  market  behavioral  equations. The
relationship  between  the  specific  interest  rates  is simply  the
ratio  of the  1988  values.  For  example,  ibep.t  - (ib*p,38/iSS6id*iBsIt.- 81 -
APPENDIX  3: BASE  SCENARIO:  1988-95  PROJECTION  OF EXOGENOUS  VARIABLES
There are  two  groups  of exogenous  variables  projected  outside  the  model.
The  first  group  are  those  variables  associated  with  the  behavioral  section  of  the
model.  The second  consists  of variables  related  to the flow-of-funds  budget
constraints. Following  is a brief discussion  of the  way in which they  were
projected  for the Base Case Scenario.  The actual  figures  are listed  in the
following  tables  A3.1 and  A3.2.
Behavioral  Section
Most  nominal  stock  variables  are  projected  to increase  with real  GDP  and
GDP price deflator  growth  which  were determined  via a preliminary  run of the
behavioral  model.  Variables  projected  this  way include  SH, SB, SMI,  SQM, and
sp5?
Real wages,  WI, are projected  to initially  decline  and then increase  at
the  end  of the  simulation  period. From  1989  to 1991  nominal  wage increases  are
projected  to lag  price  increases  by approximately  3,  2, and  1  percentage  points
respectively. In 1992 the nominal  wage increase  just  matches inflation,  and
thereafter  increases fastet  than inflation  responding  to trend productivity
growth  of apprcximately  0.82  per  year.
The  nominal  average,  exchange  rate  uses  historical  values  for  1988  through
1990,  after  which it  is projected  following  a purchasing  power  parity  rule.
Real  exog .ous  variables  are  projected  to increase  with real  GDP  growth.
These  include  chstk  and  pro.
The growth of most exogenous  domestic  prices is held constant  at 102
annually  while  exogenous  foreign  price  growth  is set  to  4.52  per  year. Domestic
prices  projected  this  way  include  P.  PD.bw PGcCP'  PofLb9  P>fj09  and  Pf  P.
Foreign  prices  projected  in  this  manner  include  Pt.pq  Pl  peb'  Pl.ptfbt  Plapftot  Pl pftp$
and  P1,pp.  PNL.t is the  exception  to this  rule since  the  base case  oil shock  is
introduced  through  this  variable,  which  is  projected  to  increase  by  34S  in 1990,
102  in 1991  and 1992,  and  4.5%  in  1993-95.  All  tariffs  are  held  to  52  across  the- 82 -
entire  simulation  period.
Budget  Constraint  Section
Many exogenous  variables are projected to increase  with nominal GDP
growth.  These include  stocks  such as: SCu, SDD, SPA, SLb.,  SLb.,b  SLb.b,  SLb1,
SLebb,  SLebb,,  SLf,  SLb,  SL,, SLp, SL,p,  SM1,  SNO4.,,  SNOLCb,  SNOL.,  SQM, SRes.  In
addition  other  variables  projected  this  way  include  TbO,  TbS,  Tfp,  Td,  T1, DRS,  Yfp
and  OthR.
The  projection  for  many  other  variables  is  calculated  from  projections  in
the  World Bank standard  attachments. Dollar  denominated  foreign  stocks  were
calculated  using  flows. These  variables  include  SFAb.,,  SFAb,  SFLI.,  SFLkb,  SIMF,
SKnei,  SLfb,  SLf.,  SLfp,  and  SLSfp.  If a sectoral  breakdown  was not  available,  we
assumed  that the composition  of the available  aggregate  flow value remained
unchanged  from the 1988  breakdown.  Values  are converted  to local  Zimbabwe  $
values  with the  average  period  exchange  rate. Other  variables  taken  from  World
Bank standard tables include:  KOGb,  KOG 0,  KOGp, ProfRemit,  and DFI.  Some
variables are held constant  at their 1988 levels such as exogenous  foreign
interest  rates,  SMI  and  SQM  multipliers,  and  the  reserve  ratio.
Finally,  two  variables,  EO and  Residb.  were taken  from  values resulting
from  previous  calibration  runs  of the  model.TABLE A3.1
ZIMBABWE  BASE SCENARIO
1988 - 1995  PROJECTION  OF EXOGENOUS  VARIABLES
(Behaviorat  Model)
Price  Growth:  1.12  1.13  1.16  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1
Real  Growth:  1.065  1.05  1.027  1.035  1.037  1.037 . 1.0386  1.04
-H  Historical  --
TIME  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  ASSUIPTIONS
CT  -7  *8  *9  -10  -11  -12  -13  -14  *15
tNFLFIP*  0  0.1866  0.1981  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 Forward  tooking  expectations
K CHGSTK  260  277.3  291.16  314.00  331.35  343.61  356.32  370.08  384.88  5X in  89
K PRO  1330.237  1512.300  1587.92  1630.79  1687.87  .r50.32  1815.08  18US.14  1960.55  5X in  89
YFN  4084.296  4255.836  4383.51  4515.02  4650.47  4760.98  '933.68  5081.69  5234.14  3.0X  wnAul  growth
STK  N  669.1  843.4  1000.69  1192.15  1357.26  1548.23  1766.06  2017.65  2308.20  (1.13)*(1.049)  growth in 1989
STK *  4146  5050  5991.83  7138.18  8126.82  9270.26  10574.59  12081.04  13820.71  (1.16)*C1.  35)  in  1990
STK  N1  1224.6  1602.700  1901.dc  2265.42  2579.18  2942.07  3356.02  3834.12  4386.23  (1.1)-CDP  growth  after
STK GM  1619.6  1859.8  2206.65  2628.83  2992.92  3414.03  3894.38  4449.17  5089.85
SPG  323.9326  580.6734  688.97  820.78  934.46  1065.94  1215.92  1389.14  1589.17
WI  2.298253  2.571139  2.826149  3.218727  3.508412  3.859253  4.278121  4.7424S1  5.257178  (7T8.9.../l.l)*CP)-tU-  l  )
EE MIST  1.661599  1.805699  2.1130  2.4700  2.6000  2.7368  2.8809  3.0325  3.1921  5.26  growth  tP'/P  *]
GRP  00CMB  0.071065  0.126184  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  10X growth  in  domestic prices
GRPDCmCP  0.101909  0.086653  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10
GRP DoNFIB  0.039047  0.344401  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.10.  0.10  0.10  0.10
CRP  OGFIO  0.039047  0.344401  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10
GRP OGFIP -0.31013  -0.17143  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10
Fp TmPCP  1.1065  1.3450  1.4055  1.4687  1.5348  1.6039  1.6761  1.7515  1.8303  4.5X  growth
FP INPCS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0 0000  a
FP:IMPFIB  1.3539  1.5508  1.6206  1.6935  1.7697  1.8493  1.9326  2.0195  2.1104  N
FPPINMPFO  1.3539  1.5508  1.6206  1.6935  1.7697  1.8493  1.9326  2.0195  2.1104
FP  IMPFIP  1.3539  1.5508  1.6206  1.6935  1.7697  1.8493  1.9326  2.0195  2.1104  a
FP INPINT  1.0941  1.2331  1.2886  1.7260  1.7454  1.7650  1.8445  1.9273  2.0142  IncLudes  oit  price shock (190 P:1.3394)
FP EXPPI  1.2482  1.3448  1.4053  1.4686  1.5347  1.6037  1.6759  1.7513  1.830 
PF  1.2341  1.3323  1.3922  1.4549  1.520.  1.5888  1.6603  1.7350  1.8130  n
tF_IMPCB  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  5X  Tariff  rate
TF INPCG  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  o.o5  n
TF IMPFIG  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05
TFQPCP  0  0.05  0.0S  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05
TF IMPFIU  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05
TF  IMPFIO  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05
TF  INPFIP  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  n
TF  IMPINT  0  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  a
D6588  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
08890  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
ALPHA  0  0  0.012  0.021  0.03  0.039  0.048  0.057  0.066 Productivity  increasesTABLE  A3.2
ZIMBABIE  BASE  SCENARIO
1988-1995  PROJECTION  OF EXOGENOUS  VARIABLES
(Budget  Constraint  Section)
TI4E  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  ASSLU4PTIONS  & SOURCES
Yearly  Price  Growth:  1.12  1.13  1.16  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1
leal CDP  Growth:  1.065  1.05  1.027  1.035  1.037  1.037  1.0386  1.04 Period  Avg EE:  1.8057  2.1130  2.4700  2.6000  2.7369  2.8W8  3.0326  3.1922  5.26%  growth  EP'/P-^]
COGb  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
COGo  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
COXp  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 0  0.0
DFl  .50.7000  7.4000  10.4  20.3  38.7  55.6  59.9  64.4  69.2  USS (CSP)  *  EE (ours) DRS  -23.1000  -27.4  -32.7  *37.2  -42.4  -48.4  -5'.3  -63.2  ORS  grows  with  infLation"real  growt
0DSFAbe  26.1000  28.2000  23.6875  30.6035  35.325  40.683  45.927  51.057  56.073  CSP (Line  1.2.)  weighted  by '88  sto D  SFAcb  276.2000  267.1000  224.1125  289.9965  334.Y?5  386.017  435.973  484.843  532.627  CSP (liM  1.2.)  weighted  by  8as sto
D SFLbs  61 .3000  62.4000  65.6  68.8  72  75.2  78.4  81.6  84.8  5s8  Sto:k Shr  of S100  flow. D  SFLcb  37.1000  29.0000  30.5  32  33.5  35  36.5  38  39.5  '88  Stock  Shr  uf $100  flow. DSINF  156.0000  71.0000  31  8  0  0  0  0  0  Sto:k  plus  flows
D0SKnei  0.0000  0.0000  0  0  0  0  0  0  0CSP  Knei  a  0 D  SLfb  1605.4000  1682.4000  1768.6  1854.8  1941  2027.2  2113.4  2199.6  2285.8  '88  Stcck  Shr of  1OO flow. D-SLfo  340.7000  340.7000  340.7  340.7  340.7  340.7  340.7  340.7  340.7  Lfo  *  C by  assumpt.  (see  -H-)
DSLfp  446.5000  177.5000  186.6  195.7  204.8  213.9  223  232.1  241.2  '88  Stock  Shr  ot  S100  flow.
0 53LSfp  266.0000  308.0000  333  358  383  408  433  458  483  '88  Stock  plus  flows
Eeop  1.6631  1.9429  2.2763  2.5342  2.6676  2.8080  2.9!58  3.1113  3.2751  Eeop  increases  via  PPP starting  '91
EO  289.8106  -105.977  467.2228  363.677  328.2293  430.6884  557.0591  710.4052  from  SIMX13 simluation.
iFAbs  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.0.40  Constant:  nominal  vaLues
iFAcb  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  0.040  Constant
ifb  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  Constant
iFLbs  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.07n  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  Constant
iFLcb  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  Constant
ifo  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  o.o02  0.072  Constant
Ifp  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  Constant
fIMF  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  Constant
IKnei  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  Constant
iLSfp  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100 Constant
Mies  0.0  0 .0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 Constant
KOGb  106.7000  113.9  202.5  226.2  251.8  275.1  300.2  327.2  CSP line F.I. NUSS)EE  ag.
KOGo  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
KOOp  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
uIttI  3.  1844  3.1844  3.1844  3.1844  3.1844  3.1844  3.1844  3.1844  constant
aIttQ  3.6952  3.6952  3.6952  3.69.2  3.6952  3.6952  3.69s2  3.6952  constant
OthR  958.5000  1137.3  1354.8  1542.5  1759.5  2007.1  2293.0  2623.2  (Inflation)*(Real  growth)
pop  0.031  0.03  0.029  0.028  0.027  0.C27  0.026  0.026  0.025  Annusl  growth,
ProfRemit  33.6000  39.9  47.5  54.1  61.7  70.4  80.4  92.0  e
rr  0.0903  0.0903  0.0903  0.0903  0.0903  0.0903  0.0903  0.0903  constant
sCu  389.3  503.3  597.2  711.4  809.9  923.9  1053.9  1204.0  1377.4  (Inflation)"(Real  growth) So0  835.3  1099.4  1304.4  1554.0  1769.2  2018.2  2302.1  2630.1  3008.8  s
SFAI  S'.7  573.9  680.9  811.2  923.6  1053.5  1201.7  1372.9  1570.6  "
SHROomFIb  0.026Z67  0.026  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  Proportion  of  total
ShROoFlo  0.011148  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011
SmR[TmpFib  0.002194  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002
SHRImpFlo  0.018258  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.018  "
SHRDOmCB  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  0.2828  " SLbo  1199.7  1357.8  1611.0  1919.3  2185.1  2492.5  2843.2  3248.2  3716.0  (Inflation)"(Real  growth)
SLbsb  388.7  572.9  679.7  809.8  922.0  1051.7  1199.6  1370.5  1567.9  "
SLbso  659.3  721.4  855.9  1019.7  1160.9  1324.3  1510.6  1725.8  1974.3  I
SLcbb  306.9  274.3  326.1  388.4  442.2  504.4  575.4  657.4  752.1  I
SLcbbs  -50.0000  -99.0000  -117.5  -139.9  -159.3  -181.7  -207.3  -236.8  -270.9  t SLfW  423.0  315.4  374.2  445.8  507.6  579.0  660.4  754.5  863.2  "
SLmb  695.6  847.7  1005.8  1198.2  1364.2  1556.1  1775.1  2027.9  2320.0  "
SLO  842.8  873.9  1036.9  1235.3  1406.3  1604.2  1829.9  2090.6  2391.7  "
SLOp  1540.9  1868.7  2217.2  2641.4  3007.2  3430.4  3913.0  4470.5  5114.2  "
SLpo  252.6  365.0  433.1  515.9  587.4  670.0  764.3  873.2  998.9
$"I  1224.6  1602.7  1901.6  2265.4  2579.2  2942.1  3356.0  3834.1  4386.2
SllOLb  364.2  549.0  651.4  776.0  883.5  1007.8  1149.6  1313.4  1502.5
SlOLcb  -49.4  -162.7  -193.0  -230.0  -261.8  -2".9.  -340.7  -389.2  -445.3  "
SNOL  314.8  386.3  458.3  546.0  621.7  709.1  808.9  924.1  1057.2  *
SoN  1619.6000  1859.8000  2206.7  2628.8  2992.9  3414.0  3894.4  4449.2  5089.9
SRES  238.7000  312.6000  370.9  441.9  503.1  573.8  654.6  747.8  855.5
SLAb  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  O.C  0.0  0.0  0.0
W1oo  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
tbo  469.8000  557.4  664.1  756.0  862.4  983.8  1123.9  1285.7  (Inflation)(Reel  growth)
Tbp  470.9000  558.7  665.6  757.8  864.4  986.1  1126.5  1288.7  "
Td  1795.9000  2130.8  2538.5  2890.1  3296.7  3760.6  4296.3  4915.0  "
Tfp  9.0000  -38.67  -32.36  -35.88  -39.41  -42.93  -46.70  *52.35  line  E.(S)'EE  (ours)
TI  974.8000  1156.6  1377.9  1568.7  1789.4  2041.2  2332.0  2667.8  (Inftation)C(Reat  growth)
Top  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Vfb  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TUp  0.0000  9690.2600  11497.49  13697.19  15594.26  17788.37  20291.19  23181.87  26520.06  (Inflation)"(Real  growth)- 85 -
APPENDIX  4s  BASE  SCENARIO:  1988-95 SIMULATION RESULTS  FOR  ENDOGENOUS
VARIABLES  AND COMPLETE  BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
The  following  tables  A4.1  and  A4.2  present  the  complete  set  of  1988-95
simulation  values  for  all  endogenous  variables  and  sector  budget  constraints  for
the  base  scenario.- 86  -
Table A4.1
ZIM5UBWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988  - 1995
ALL ENOOGENOUS  VARIABLES
AVG
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  GROWTH
3ass33  33s3s3  .- 3333  33333  333333  3a333  Ba3s"  3333  3s3
CG  2450.05  2904.41  3460.81  3927.38  4471.72  5104.30  5833.89  6675.86  15.401
CHY  0.0656  0.0491  0.0272  0.0314  0.0351  0.0377  0.0390  0.0403  -6.721
DYPP  8395.20  9761.59  11554.89  12878.14  14526.20  16586.96  18963.35  21703.82  14.53%
EXP  3325.81  4250.43  5336.73  6054.07  688S.48  7846.35  8950.35  10219.48  17.391
GDP  10644.09  12584.12  14722.14  16410.06  18521.85  21167.61  24217.51  2772.31  14.66X
IBB  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.15  1.63X
IMP  2931.82  4071.72  5543.84  6233.69  7019.90  8053.42  9250.75  10635.01  20.21X
low  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  3.09s
KK  9879.42  10098.59  10247.77  10431.26  10645.05  10881.48  11142.48  11429.91  2.101
K Cs  1288.82  1352.07  1338.86  1432.82  1483.10  1539.00  1599.07  1663.51  3.711
K  CG  1288.82  1352.07  1388.86  1432.82  1483.10  1539.00  1599.07  1663.51  3.71%
K CP  2257.30  2354.96  2411.13  2471.84  2554.40  2654.21  2761.28  2875.65  3.52x
K DONCS  1288.82  1352.07  1388.86  1432.82  1483.10  1539.00  1599.07  1663.51  3.711
K DOMCG  1288.82  1352.07  1388.86  1432.82  1483.10  1539.00  1599.07  1663.51  3.71X
K DOMCP  2030.04  2128.36  2186.64  2241.70  2316.58  2407.09  2504.20  2607.91  3.641
K DOMFI  245.95  309.25  295.82  311.69  327.35  341.63  357.12  373.86  6.16%
r  DONFIS  119.71  149.49  153.56  158.42  163.98  170.16  176.80  183.92  6.331
K  DOMFIG  170.51  202.79  208.31  214.90  222.44  230.82  239.83  249.50  5.59s
K DOMKI0  50.81  53.30  54.75  56.48  58.46  60.67  63.04  65.58  3.711
K  DOMFIP  75.44  106.47  87.51  96.79  104.92  110.80  117.29  124.37  7.40X
K EXP  1369.58  1431.38  1471.24  1517.25  1568.74  1625.14  1685.28  1749.31  3.561
K Fl  525.68  663.74  603.62  644.64  683.20  715.46  750.67  788.84  !:.97x
K FIG  263.72  300.57  308.75  318.52  329.70  342.12  355.48  369.80  4.951
K FIO  134.01  140.59  144.42  148.99  154.22  160.03  166.27  172.97  3.711
K FIP  261.96  363.17  294.87  326.12  353.50  373.33  395.19  419.04  6.941
K GDP  4557.36  4781.00  4911.12  5066.55  5244.35  5442.02  5654.46  5882.28  3.711
K IMP  1161.32  1312.31  1277.73  1331.35  1388.70  1448.11  1511.95  1579.91  4.501
K  IMPC  227.26  226.60  224.49  230.14  237.83  247.12  257.09  267.74  2.371
k:.IMPC  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
k:MPCP  227.26  226.60  224.49  230.14  237.83  247.12  257.09  267.74  2.371
KIMPFI  279.73  354.48  307.80  332.95  355.84  373.83  393.55  414.98  5.80s
K-IMPFIS  10.00  10.49  10.77  11.12  11.51  11.94  12.41  12.91  3.711
K  IMPFIC  93.21  97.78  100.46  103.62  107.26  111.30  115.64  120.30  3.71X
K:IMPFIC  83.21  87.29  89.67  92.51  95.75  99.36  103.24  107.40  3.71X
k:IMPFIP  186.52  256.70  207.36  229.33  248.59  262.53  277.90  294.67  6.75s
K IM?INT  654.33  731.23  745.44  768.26  795.03  827.16  861.31  897.20  4.611
Kys  4557.36  4781.00  4911.12  5066.55  5244.35  5442.02  5654.44  5882.28  3.7^1
KYSC  5133.77  5296.84  5505.23  5678.78  5874.34  6090.54  6323.75  6575.72  3.601
P-  2.34  2.63  3.00  3.24  3.53  3.89  4.28  4.71  10.55X
P C8  1.90  2.15  2.49  2.74  3.02  3.32  3.65  4.01  11.261
P  CG  1.90  2.15  2.49  2.74  3.02  3.32  3.65  4.01  11.26X
P CHSTK  1.39  0.41  1.91  0 78  -Q.00  *0.02  0.02  0.04  -40.26X
P CP  2.4:.  2.78  3.24  3.56  3.92  4.31  4.74  5.21  11.471
P bOmCB  1.90  2.15  2.49  2.74  3.02  3.32  3.65  4.01  11.26%
p DOMCC  1.90  2.15  2.49  2.74  3.02  3.32  3.65  4.01  11.26%
P OomCP  2.42  2.74  3.18  3.50  3.85  4.23  4.65  5.12  11.26%
P DOMFIB  3.97  4.48  5.20  5.72  6.29  6.92  7.61  8.37  11.26%
pOOMFIG  3.97  4.48  5.20  5.72  6.29  6.92  7  61  8.37  11.26%
F DONFIO  3.97  4.48  5.20  5.72  6.29  6.92  7.61  8.37  11.261
POOMFIP  5.48  6.19  7.18  7.90  8.6V  9.56  10.52  11.57  11.26%
P  EXPPI  2.43  2.97  3.63  3.99  4.39  4.83  5.31  5.84  13.36%
P FIB  3.89  4.42  5.15  5.66  6.23  6.85  7.53  8.29  11.42%
PFIG  3.60  4.19  4.94  5.43  5.97  6.57  7.23  7.95  11.971
PFIO  3.33  3.93  4.70  5.17  5.68  6.25  6.88  7.57  12.441
P  FlP  3.67  4.36  5.22  5.74  6.32  6.95  7.64  8.41  12.561
PINPcU  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
PwIMpcp  2.55  3.12  3.81  4.19  4.61  5.07  5.58  6.13  13.361
PINPfIS  2.94  3.60  4.39  4.83  5.31  5.85  6.43  7.07  13.36%
PWIPFIC  2.94  3.60  4.39  4.83  5.31  5.85  6.43  7.07  13.36X
P.INPFIO  2.94  3.60  4.39  4.83  5.31  5.85  6.43  7.07  13.361
P IMPFIP  2.94  3.60  4.39  4.83  5.31  5.85  6.43  7.07  13.36%
:IMPINT  2.34  2.86  4.48  4.77  5.07  5.58  6.14  6.75  16.361
P.ImPPI  2.52  3.10  4.34  4.68  5.06  5.56  6.12  6.73  15.041-87-
Tablt  A4.1
ZIMBABWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS, 1988 - 1995
ALL ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES
AVG
1988  1989  1990  1991  19m  1993  1994  1995  GROWTH
Nassau  333333  3333m3  333888  3.333.  333333  .. 33  sun*"  _88  .3
CU  114.00  93.87  114.25  98.53  113.96  129.99  150.14  173.38  6.17K
OYP  7321.16  8601.04  9990.65  11105.71  12551.48  14435.21  16619.86  19148.91  14.72K
EE  1.81  2.11  2.47  2.60  2.74  2.88  3.03  3.19  8.48K
cABS  3.79  -9.53  17.08  12.28  14.66  15.11  15.56  16.01  22.85s
FACS  -16.43  -90.83  162.73  116.95  139.70  143.92  148.20  152.53
FLUS  1.99  6.76  7.90  8.32  8.76  9.22  9.70  10.21  26.36K
FLCB  -14.63  3.17  3.70  3.90  4.11  4.32  4.55  4.79
IBO  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  1.63X
leSs  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  1.63K
1sso  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  1.14  0.14  0.14  1.63K
IBSP  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.15  1.63K
ICBB  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  1.63K
ICBBS  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  o.1o  1.63X
IC8O  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  1.63K
ICBP  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.15  1.63X
IMF  -153.48  -84.52  -56.81  -20.80  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -100.00%
INFLATE  0.12  0.13  0.14  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  -2.35s
INOLDS  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.12  3.09o
INOLCI  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.12  3.09X
IP6  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  1.63%
IPO  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  1.63K
KNEI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
K  FIB  129.71  159.98  164.33  169.53  173.48  182.10  1e9.20  196.83  6.14X
LIo  158.10  253.23  308.22  265.82  307.44  350.70  405.04  467.75  16.76K
LBSB  184.20  106.85  130.05  112.16  129.72  147.97  170.90  197.36  0.99K
LOSO  62.10  134.54  163.76  141.23  163.34  186.32  21s.20  248.51  21.91%
LBSP  327.74  364.27  409.73  353.73  407.03  464.42  536.54  619.78  9.53K
LCBB  -32.10  51.25  62.38  53.80  62.22  70.98  81.98  94.67
LCBBS  -49.00  -18.46  -22.47  -19.38  .22.42  -25.57  -29.53  -34.10  -5.05o
LCBO  -31.17  -92.92  -118.81  25.17  28.24  44.24  56.52  73.04
LCBP  0.50  140.40  -33.19  -101.52  -100.50  -114.71  -122.05  -131.46
LFS  139.04  182.14  212.91  224.12  23s.92  248.34  261.41  275.16  10.24X
LFO  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
LFP  -485.73  19.23  22.48  23.66  24.91  26.22  27.60  29.05
LPB  393.49  653.31  732.17  862.98  1037.9?  1265.86  1542.18  1875.59  24.99K
LPO  112.40  68.07  82.86  71.46  82.64  94.27  108.88  125.74  1.61K
LSFP  75.84  52.82  61.75  65.00  68.42  72.02  75.81  79.80  0.73n
M1  378.11  298.91  363.82  313.76  362.89  413.95  478.10  552.12  5.56K
NIBS  49.98  72.94  86.94  106.35  123.96  144.79  168.96  197.31  21.67K
NBCB  39.47  34.99  41.70  51.01  59.46  69.45  81.04  94.64  13.31K
NBF  192.24  235.35  289.86  338.43  372.80  409.85  449.76  492.75  14.39s
NIP  365.55  412.05  497.44  606.95  737.44  898.02  1096.95  1343.26  20.43K
NBSCS  -4.50  *8.82  -10.51  -12.86  -14.99  -17.51  -20.43  -23.86  26.91K
NFABS  1.74  2.19  2.16  3.10  3.77  4.57  5.43  6.35  20.36K
NFACS  18.37  20.76  20.41  29.40  35.74  43.36  51.55  60.34  18.51X
NFL8S  7.14  8.49  10.45  12.20  13.44  14.78  16.22  17.77  13.92K
NFLCB  4.32  3.94  4.86  5.68  6.26  6.88  7.55  8.28  9.74K
NIMF  18.16  9.66  4.94  1.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -100.00K
NKNEI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
NNOLBS  36.45  57.40  69.73  85.32  99.98  117.52  138.16  162.68  23.82x
NNOLCB  -4.94  -17.01  -20.67  -25.29  -29.63  -34.83  -40.95  -48.21  38.45K
mm  120.32  134.84  160.70  196.58  229.14  267.65  312.32  364.72  17.17K
MOBS  84.78  91.85  109.47  133.91  156.09  182.32  212.76  248.45  16.60K
OC  23.60  19.40  7.60  -7.80  -4.60  -0.82  5.39  13.64  -7.53x
VOF  40.80  47.66  55.84  62.16  65.4  68.88  72.51  76,32  9.36K
mOLs  184.80  102.39  124.62  107.48  124.31  141.80  163.77  189.12  0.33K
oLCB  -113.30  -30.34  -36.93  -31.8S  -36.84  -42.02  -48.s3  -56.05  -9.57x
OP  32.48  46.47  S5.39  67.75  78.9s  92.25  107.65  125.71  21.33K
NPDS  200.31  240.51  288.68  350.83  407.26  473.67  SSO.68  640.96  18.08K
NPCS  0.00  0.06  18.22  14.30  0.84  -13.12  -29.76  *48.18
MPF  37.13  17.24  21.24  24.80  27.32  30.03  32.96  36.11  -0.40K
No"  133.73  160.41  194.88  238.46  279.43  328.46  386.13  454.66  19.10K
NRES  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  C.00  0.00
NSPF  U.24  59.84  75.80  90.72  102.17  114.57  127.98  142.50  18.19K
Oa  24G.19  346.85  422.18  364.09  421.10  480.35  554.79  640.68  15.05%- 38  -
Table  A4.1
ZIMBABWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988  - 1995
ALL ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES
AVG
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  GROWTH
333333  33333=  3as333  s33333  33ass3  2s3a3s  23s333  ==Zu33  383833
RES  73.96  58.31  70.98  61.21  70.79  80.76  93.27  107.71  5.52X
RESIDOS  164.00  190.03  222.70  271.06  313.22  362.11  417.74  481.82  16.64%
RESIOCB  59.40  69.79  88.27  92.24  99.83  109.30  121.18  136.52  12.622
RFABS  7.58  8.00  6.11  4.30  5.21  6.25  7.37  8.57  1.752
RFACB  75.96  75.74  57.88  40.74  49.47  59.34  69.96  81.35  0.982
RFLBS  17.29  19.86  15.91  9.16  10.08  11.07  12.14  13.29  -3.69X
RFLCB  9.26  9.23  7.40  4.26  4.69  5.15  5.65  6.19  -5.592
RIMF  31.95  15.47  5.94  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -100.002
RKNEI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
RLFB  459.35  535.38  428.93  246.95  271.74  298.46  327.24  358.22  -3.492
RLFO  95.24  105.57  81.56  44.29  46.62  49.08  51.66  54.38  -7.692
RLFP  87.91  56.49  45.26  26.06  28.67  31.49  34.53  37.80  -11.362
RLSFP  80.12  99.52  81.32  48.23  54.19  60.64  67.62  75.17  -0.91X
SB  -129.07  -146.56  -186.23  -253.85  -317.58  -410.41  -526.21  -671.07  26.562
SOS  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
SCB  3.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
SFABS  54.78  53.24  76.44  93.01  112.89  134.25  157.18  181.75  18.692
SFACB  518.83  503.74  724.36  882.04  1071.20  1274.47  1492.62  1726.50  18.742
SFLS  121.17  147.79  171.61  189.09  207.93  228.22  250.06  273.56  12.342
SFLCB  56.33  68.73  79.84  88.00  96.79  106.27  116.47  127.45  12.372
SF CAP  -45.48  259.0S  727.40  772.49  783.42  917.42  1077.49  1266.86
SF CHECK  -45.48  259.05  727.40  772.49  783.42  917.42  1077.49  1266.86
SFCUR  -45.48  259.05  727.40  772.49  783.42  917.42  1077.49  1266.86
SH  815.96  968.14  1153.37  1313.11  1497.86  1708.61  1952.02  2233.11  15.472
SIMF  137.86  68.81  17.95  -2.36  -2.36  -2.36  -2.36  -2.36
SKNEI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
SLBSP  1868.64  2232.91  2642.63  2996.56  3403.39  3867.81  4404.35  5024.13  15.182
SLCBO  152.33  59.41  -59.39  -34.23  -5.98  38.25  94.78  167.82  1.392
SLCBP  0.50  140.90  107.72  6.20  -94.30  -209.01  -331.05  -462.52
SLFB  3268.29  3985.81  4627.66  5098.73  5606.39  6653.19  6741.83  7375.22  12.332
SLFO  661.94  767.51  849.07  893.36  939.99  989.06  1040.72  1095.10  7.462
tIFP  344.75  420.46  488.19  537.91  591.49  649.20  711.32  778.17  12.332
SLPB  3236.19  3889.50  4621.67  5484.65  6522.62  7788.48  9330.66  11206.24  19.422
SLSFP  598.36  750.70  893.78  1007.01  1129.62  1262.28  1405.72  1560.70  14.682
SMi  1602.71  1901.61  2265.43  2579.19  2942.08  3356.04  3834.14  4386.25  15.472
s0  144.72  189.79  242.42  266.25  294.96  325.11  358.02  393.68  15.372
SP  2328.23  2660.70  2880.11  3075.99  3418.81  4002.83  4688.28  5488.21  13.032
SPG  580.55  706.88  827.06  869.31  945.85  1028.51  1114.19  1200.13  10.93x
SaM  1859.79  2206.65  2628.82  2992.91  3414.02  3894.37  4449.16  5089.84  15.472
SRES  312.66  370.98  441.95  503.16  573.96  654.71  747.98  855.69  15.472
STK  B  5049.99  5897.16  7075.77  8410.44  9978.08  11851.91  14088.99  16761.45  18.692
STK H  843.47  1000.77  1192.24  1357.37  1548.35  1766.20  2017.81  2308.38  15.472
STK  MI  1602.71  1901.61  2265.43  2579.19  2942.08  3356.04  3834.14  4386.25  15.472
STK GM  1859.79  2206.65  2628.82  2992.91  3414.02  3894.37  4449.16  5089.84  15.472
YFP  9692.39  11454.93  13376.91  14878.52  16774.82  19174.77  21940.77  25124.72  14.582- 89  -
Table  A4.2
ZIMBABWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988-1995
BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
AVG
TIME  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  GROWTH
s=_9or  Z.....  .......  =..  .... s.  onN  .... Su...  .-ssex...  sums  sasan
BDGET
CURRENT  SB  -129.1  -146.6  -186.?  -25.5.8  -317.6  *410.4  -526.2  -671.1  26.56%
TD  1795.9  2130.8  2538.5  2890.1  3296.7  3760.6  4296.3  4915.0  15.47%
TI  974.8  1156.6  1377.9  1568.7  1789.4  2041.2  2332.0  2667.8  15.47%
OTHR  958.5  1137.3  1354.8  1542.5  1759.5  2007.1  2293.0  2623.2  15.47%
RESIDCB  59.4  69.8  88.3  92.2  99.8  109.3  121.2  136.5  12.62%
YFB  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
COGS  0.0  0.0  0.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  o.n
NOB  120.3  134.8  160.7  *"S.6  229.1  267.6  312.3  364.7  17.17%
CB  2450.1  2904.4  3460.8  .927.4  4471.7  5104.3  5833.9  6675.S  15.40%
TSO  469.8  557.4  664.1  756.0  862.4  963.8  1123.9  1285.7  15.47X
SUBs  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TaP  470.9  558.7  665.6  757.8  864.4  986.1  1126.5  1288.7  15.47%
N8CB  39.5  35.0  41.7  51.0  59.5  69.5  81.0  94.6  13.31%
NBBS  50.0  72.9  86.9  106.3  124.0  144.8  169.0  197.3  21.67%
NBP  365.6  412.0  497.4  606.9  737.4  898.0  1096.9 1343.3  20.43%
NBF  192.2  235.3  289.9  338.4  372.8  409.8  449.8  492.7  14.39%
BUDGET
CAPITAL  SB  -129.1  -146.6  *186.2  -253.8  -317.6  -410.4  -526.2  -671.1  26.56%
FIB  504.2  707.7  845.6  959.6  1092.6  1247.2  1425.4  1631.2  18.26%
LBO  158.1  253.2  308.2  265.8  307.4  350.7  405.0  467.7  16.76%
KOGB  106.7  113.9  202.5  226.2  251.8  275.1  300.2  327.2  17.36%
LCBB  -32.1  51.3  62.4  53.8  62.2  71.0  82.0  94.7
LBSB  184.2  106.8  130.0  112.2  129.7  148.0  170.9  197.4  0.99%
LF8  139.0  182.1  212.9  224.1  235.9  248.3  261.4  275.2  10.24%
LPG  393.5  653.3  732.2  863.0  1038.0  1265.9  1542.2  1875.6  24.99%
OTHER
CURRENT  SO  144.7  189.8  242.4  266.2  295.0  325.1  358.0  393.7  15.37%
ORS  -23.1  -27.4  -32.7  -37.2  -42.4  -48.4  -55.3  -63.2  15.47%
TBO  469.8  557.4  664.1  756.0  862.4  983.8  1123.9  1285.7  15.47%
COGO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
SUsO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
NOB  120.3  134.8  160.7  196.6  229.1  267.6  312.3  364.7  17.17%
NOCs  23.6  19.4  7.6  *7.8  -4.6  -0.8  5.4  13.6  -7.53%
NOSS  84.8  91.9  109.5  133.9  156.1  182.3  212.8  248.4  16.60%
NOP  32.5  46.5  55.4  67.8  79.0  92.2  107.6  125.7  21.33X
NOF  40.8  47.7  55.8  62.2  65.4  68.9  72.5  76.3  9.36%
TOP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
OTHER
CAPITAL  SO  144.7  189.8  242.4  266.2  295.0  325.1  358.0  393.7  15.37%
FIO  446.1  552.7  678.4  769.9  876.6  1000.6  1143.7  1308.7  16.62%
KOGO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
LBO  158.1  253.2  308.2  265.8  307.4  350.7  405.0  467.7  16.76%
LCBO  -31.2  -92.9  -118.8  25.2  28.2  44.2  56.5  73.0
LBSO  62.1  134.5  163.8  141.2  163.3  186.3  215.2  248.5  21.91%
LFO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
LPU  iiz.4  wU  . 82.9  71.5  82.6  94.3  108.9  125.7  1.61%- 90  -
Tabt  A4.2
ZIMBASWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988-1995
BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
AVG
TIME  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  GROWTH
museum  =.uZU  U"UUU  Monaca  "No  NOSS.  Susumu  ;UU  - :xU==
CENTRAL  BANK
CURRENT  SCB  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
RESIDCB  59.4  69.8  88.3  92.2  99.8  109.3  121.2  136.5  12.62K
NBCB  39.5  35.0  41.7  51.0  59.5  69.5  81.0  94.6  13.31X
NoCB  23.6  19.4  7.6  -7.8  -4.6  -0.8  5.4  13.6  -7.53X
NBSCB  -4.5  -8.8  -10.5  -12.9  -15.0  -17.5  -20.4  -23.9  26.91t
NPCB  0.0  0.1  18.2  14.3  0.8  -13.1  -29.8  -48.2
NFACS  18.4  20.8  20.4  29.4  35.7  43.4  51.5  60.3  18.51K
NRES  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
NFLCB  4.3  3.9  4.9  5.7  6.3  6.9  7.6  8.3  9.74X
NIMF  18.2  9.7  4.9  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -100.00X
NNOLCB  -4.9  -17.0  -20.7  -25.3  -29.6  -34.8  -40.9  -48.2  38.45X
CENTRAL  BANK
CAPITAL  SCS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
LCBB  -32.1  51.3  62.4  53.8  62.2  71.0  82.0  94.7
LCBO  -31.2  -92.9  -118.8  25.2  28.2  44.2  56.5  73.0
LCBBS  -49.0  -18.5  -22.5  -. 9.4  -22.4  -25.6  -29.5  -34.1  -5.05X
LCBP  0.5  140.4  *33.2  -101.5  *100.5  -114.7  -122.0  -131.5
fACB  -16.4  -90.8  162.7  116.9  139.7  143.9  148.2  152.5
RFACB  76.0  75.7  57.9  40.7  49.5  59.3  70.0  81.3  0.98K
RES  74.0  58.3  71.0  61.2  70.8  80.8  93.3  107.7  5.52X
CU  114.0  93.9  114.2  98.5  114.0  130.0  150.1  173.4  6.17K
FLCB  -14.6  3.2  3.7  3.9  4.1  4.3  4.5  4.8
IMF  -153.5  -84.5  -56.8  -20.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -100.00X
NOLCB  -113.3  *30.3  -36.9  -31.9  -36.8  -42.0  -48.5  -56.0  -9.57K
RFLCB  9.3  9.2  7.4  4.3  4.7  5.2  5.7  6.2  -5.59K
RIMF  31.9  15.5  5.9  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -100.00K
BANKING
CURRENT  SBS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
NPBS  200.3  240.5  288.7  350.8  407.3  473.7  550.7  641.0  18.08K
MS:S  50.0  72.9  86.9  106.3  124.0  "t.8  169.0  197.3  21.67X
NOBS  84.8  91.9  109.5  133.9  156.1  :  3  212.8  248.4  16.60K
NRES  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  V.0  0.0  0.0
NFABS  1.7  2.2  2.2  3.1  3.8  4.6  5.4  6.4  20.36K
NON  133.7  160.4  194.9  238.5  279.4  328.5  386.1  454.7  19.10K
NSSCB  -4.5  -8.8  -10.5  -12.9  *15.0  -17.5  -20.4  -23.9  26.91K
NFLBS  7.1  8.5  10.5  12.2  13.4  14.8  16.2  17.8  13.92K
NNOLBS  36.4  57.4  69.7  85.3  100.0  117.5  138.2  162.7  23.82K
RESIDBS  164.0  190.0  222.7  271.1  313.2  362.1  417.7  481.8  16.64K
BANKING
CAPITAL  S8S  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
LBS8  184.2  106.8  130.0  112.2  129.7  148.0  170.9  197.4  0.99K
LSO  62.1  134.5  163.8  141.2  163.3  186.3  215.2  248.5  21.91K
LBSP  327.7  364.3  409.7  353.7  407.0  464.4  536.5  619.8  9.53K
RES  74.0  58.3  71.0  61.2  70.8  80.8  93.3  107.7  5.52X
FASS  3.8  *9.5  17.1  12.3  14.7  15.1  15.6  16.0  22.85X
RFABS  7.6  8.0  6.1  4.3  5.2  6.3  7.4  8.6  1.75K
ON  240.2  346.9  422.2  364.1  421.1  480.4  554.8  640.7  15.05%
M1  378.1  298.9  363.8  313.8  362.9  414.0  478.1  552.1  5.56K
CU  114.0  93.9  114.2  98.5  114.0  130.0  150.1  173.4  6.17K
LCBBS  -49.0  -18.5  -22.5  -19.4  -22.4  -25.6  -29.5  -34.1  -5.05K
FLBS  2.0  6.8  7.9  8.3  8.8  9.2  9.7  10.2  26.36X
HOLBS  184.8  102.4  124.6  107.5  124.3  141.8  163.8  189.1  0.33X
RFLBS  17.3  19.9  15.9  9.2  10.1  11.1  12.1  13.3  *3.69X- 91  -
Tablt  A4.2
ZINSAUWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESULTS,  1988-1995
BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
AVG
TIME  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  GROUTH
axouus  =uuass  mumugs  Romans  =Runs=  *mUUas  saunas  UUUUU
PRIVATE
CURRENT  SP  2328.2  2660.V  280.1  3076.0  3418.8  4002.8  41.3  5488.2  13.03K
YFP  9692.4  11454.9  13376.9  14878.5  16774.8  19174.8  21940.8  25124.7  14.58X
TSP  470.9  558.7  665.6  757 8  86.4  966.1  1126.5  1288.7  15.47X
TOP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TFP  9.0  -38.7  -32.4  -35.9  39.4  -42.9  -46.7  -52.4
COGP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
RESIOS  164.0  190.0  222.7  271.1  313.2  362.1  417.7  481.8  16.64X
NlP  365.6  412.0  497.4  606.9  737.4  896.0  1096.9  1343.3  20.43X
NOP  32.5  46.5  55.4  67.8  79.0  92.2  107.6  125.7  21.33X
NON  133.7  160.4  194.0  238.5  279.4  328.5  386.1  454.7  19.10K
NNOLCB  -4.9  -17.0  -20.7  -25.3  -29.6  -34.8  -40.9  -48.2  38.45X
NNOLBS  36.4  57.4  69.7  85.3  100.0  117.5  138.2  162.7  23.82X
CP  5501.7  6538.0  7804.8  8801.4  10004.9  11435.4  13086.5  14991.3  15.40X
TO  1795.9  2130.8  2538.5  2890.1  3296.7  3760.6  4296.3  4915.0  15.47X
OTHR  958.5  1137.3  1354.8  1542.5  1759.5  2007.1  2293.0  2623.2  15.47X
PROFREMIT  33.6  39.9  47.5  54.1  61.7  70.4  80.4  92.0  15.47X
NPCB  0.0  0.1  18.2  14.3  0.8  -13.1  -29.8  -48.2
NPBS  200.3  240.5  288.7  350.5  407.3  473.7  550.7  641.0  18.08X
NPF  37.1  17.2  21.2  24.8  27.3  30.0  33.0  36.1  -0.40K
NSPF  44.2  59.8  75.8  90.7  102.2  114.6  128.0  142.5  18.19K
NKNEI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
PRIVATE
CAPITAL  SP  2328.2 2660.7  2880.1  3076.0  3418.8  4002.8  4688.3  5488.2  13.03M
FIP  961.8  1582.3  1539.4  1872.8  2233.1  2594.2  3020.7  3523.3  20.38X
CHANGESTK  386.3  120.3  600.3  258.6  -22.7  -7.0  7.8  14.6  -37.40K
LPB  393.5  653.3  732.2  863.0  1038.0  1265.9  1542.2  1875.6  24.99X
LPO  112.4  68.1  82.9  71.5  82.6  94.3  108.9  125.7  1.61X
11  378.  298.9  363.8  313.8  362.9  414.0  478.1  552.1  5.564
am  240.  346.9  422.2  364.1  421.1  480.4  554.8  640.7  15.05K
NOLCB  -113..~  -30.3  -36.9  -31.9  -36.8  -42.0  -48.5  *56.0  -9.57X
NOLBS  184.8  102.4  124.6  107.5  124.3  141.8  163.8  189.1  0.33X
L_rP  0.5  140.4  -33.2  -101.5  -100.5  -114.7  -122.0  -131.5
LBSP  327.7  364.3  409.7  353.7  407.0  464.4  536.5  619.8  9.53K
LFP  -485.7  19.2  22.5  23.7  24.9  26.2  27.6  29.0
LSFP  75.8  52.8  61.8  65.0  68.4  72.0  75.8  79.8  0.73K
EO  289.8  -106.0  467.2  363.7  328.2  430.7  557.1  710.4  13.67K
DFI  7.4  10.4  20.3  38.7  55.6  5Q.9  64.4  69.2  37.63X
KOGP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
KNEI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0-92-
Table  A4.2
ZIMBABWE  BASE  SCENARIO
SIMULATION  RESUILTS,  1988-1995
BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
AVG
TIME  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  GROWTH
Y-a-33  3s3333  33nm33  3333--  33333n  333333  33333  33333
FOREIGN
CURRENT  SF  CUR  -45.5  259.1  727.4  772.5  753.4  917.4  1077.5  1266.9
NSF  192.2  235.3  289.9  338.4  372.8  409.8  449.8  492.7  14.391
NOF  40.8  47.7  55.8  62.2  65.4  68.9  72.5  76.3  9.36X
NPF  37.1  17.2  21.2  24.8  27.3  30.0  33.0  36.1  -0.40X
NSPF  44.2  59.8  75.8  90.7  102.2  114.6  128.0  142.5  18.19X
NKNEI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  r.0
NFLCB  4.3  3.9  4.9  5.7  6.3  6.9  7.6  8.3  9.74X
NFLBS  7.1  8.5  10.5  12.2  13.4  14.8  16.2  17.8  13.921
NIMF  18.2  9.7  4.9.  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -100.00O
PROFREMIT 33.6  39.9  47.S  54.1  61.7  70.4  80.4  92.0  15.47X
IMP  2931.8  4071.7  5543.8  6233.7  7019.9  8053.4  9250.7  10635.0  20.21X
EXP  3325.8 4250.4 5336.7  6054.1  6885.5  7846.4  8950.4  10219.5  17.39X
COGS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
COGO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
COGP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TFP  9.0  -38.7  -32.4  -35.9  -39.4  -42.9  -46.7  -52.4
NFACB  18.4  20.8  20.4  29.4  35.7  43.4  51.5  60.3  18.51X
NFABS  1.7  2.2  2.2  3.1  3.8  4.6  5.4  6.4  20.36X
FOREiGN
CAPITAL  SF  CAP  -45.5  259.1  727.4  772.5  783.4  917.4  1077.5  1266.9
LFB  139.0  182.1  212.9  224.1  235.9  248.3  261.4  275.2  10.24X
LFO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
LFP  *485.7  19.2  22.5  23.7  24.9  26.2  27.6  29.0
LSFP  75.8  52.8  61.8  65.0  68.4  72.0  75.8  79.8  0.73n
KOGS  106.7  113.9  202.5  226.2  251.8  275.1  300.2  327.2  17.36X
KOGO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
KOGP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
DFI  7.4  10.4  20.3  38.7  55.6  59.9  64.4  69.2  37.63X
KNEI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
FLCB  -14.6  3.2  3.7  3.9  4.1  4.3  4.5  4.8
1MF  -153.5  -84.5  -36.8  -20.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -100.00X
FLBS  2.0  6.8  7.9  8.3  8.8  9.2  9.7  10.2  26.36X
EO  289.8  -106.0  467.2  363.7  328.2  430.7  557.1  710.4  13.671
RFLCB  9.3  9.2  7.4  4.3  4.7  5.2  5.'  6.2  -5.59X
RIMF  31.9  15.5  5.9  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -100.00X
RFLBS  17.3  19.9  15.9  9.2  10.1  11.1  12.1  13.3  -3.69X
FACB  -16.4  -90.8  162.7  116.9  139.7  143.9  148.2  152.5
FASS  3.8  -9.5  17.1  12.3  14.7  15.1  15.6  16.0  22.851
RFACS  76.0  75.7  57.9  40.7  49.5  59.3  70.0  81.3  0.981
RFABS  7.6  8.0  6.1  4.3  5.2  6.3  7.4  8.6  1.75%
FOREIGN
CHECK  SF CHECK  -45.5  259.1  727.4  772.5  783.4  917.4  1077.5  1266.9
FIB  504.2  707.7  845.6  959.6  1092.6 1247.2 1425.4  1631.2  18.26X
FIO  446.1  552.7  678.4  769.9  876.6  1000.6 1143.7  1308.7  16.621
FIP  961.8  15C2.3 1539.4  1872.8  2233.1  2594.2  3020.7  3523.3  20.381
CHANGESTK 386.3  120.3  600.3  258.6  -Z2.7  -7.0  7.8  14.6  -37.40X
SB  -129.1 -146.6  -186.2  -253.8 -317.6  -410.4 -526.2  -671.1  26.561
SO  144.7  189.8  242.4  266.2  295.0  325.1  358.0  393.7  15.37X
SCB  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
SOS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
SP  2328.2  2660.7  2880.1  3076.0  3418.8  4002.8  4688.3  5488.2  13.03X- 93  -
APPENDIX 5:  SUGGESTED  MODEL  AMENDMENTS  AND EXTENSIONS
This  appendix briefly discusses future changes and additions to the
present  model.
Modeling  the  effects  of a trade  reform  using  RMSM-XX  as it  now  stands  is
problematic.  One  suggestion  is  to introduce  a  negative  tariff  equivalent  to the
effects  of  the  reform  --  an  estimation  that  will  require  a detailed  study  of the
current  trade  regime.
Another  area  open  to future  additions  is  the  manner  in  which  expectations
are formed.  Ideally a perfect-foresight  specification  with forward-looking
expectations  should  be incorporated  due to the importance  of this feature  for
investment  and  portfolio  decisions.
The choice  of adjusting  variables,  both in the  IE  block  of equations  and
in  the  budget  constraints,  reflects  an a  priori  decision  about  which  variable  is
most interesting  and therefore  should  be modeled.  Howiver,  there  is still  a
certain element of arbitrariness  in this selection  due to the fundamental
characteristic  of these  types of models  where only one variable is directly
influenced  by an exogenous  shock.  For  example,  we chose  PFh,h  as the  adjusting
price  deflator  (see  footnote  7)  because  it is  a "terminal"  deflator  which  does
not have large  effects  on aggregate  demand  in the  behavioral  equations. This
means  that  the  income  effect  of  an  oil  shock  is  transmitted  through  this  variable
and  spill-over  effects  are  limited  to  the  corresponding  adjusting  variable,  which
for instance  is private fixed  investment  under  the oil shock  scenario  with a
binding  foreign  resource  constraint.  However,  in  reality  the  effects  of  a shock
do not fall strictly  on one  variable.  One solution  would be to distribute  a
shock  among  all  the  variables  but  the  actual  manner  in  which  to do this  is  also
a subjective  decision.
Many  exogenous  variables  were projected  entirely  outside  the  model  due  to
software  limitations. (See  Appendix  A3.1  and  A3.2.  fL  a  complete  discussion  of
the  projection  rules.) In future  extensions,  many  of these  variables  should  be- 94 -
projected  within  the  model  using  simple  growth  rule.  thereby  making  thim
*ndogenouse  However,  this  requires  that  current  software  barriers  be  addressed.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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